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At least 25 countries have used IPO auctions, but most have since abandoned them. We argue that
this is because auctions, being indirect mechanisms, require a level of sophistication above that of
many investors. Through suitably calibrated examples, we show that even sophisticated investors can
make mistakes while bidding in auctions, especially when facing uncertainty about the number and
type of bidders, and such mistakes impose costs on other participants. We provide empirical support
for our arguments. IPO auctions have been plagued by unexpectedly large fluctuations in the number
of participants, return chasing investors, and high-bidding free riders. Our analysis suggests that a
direct mechanism that resembles a transparent version of book building would be preferable to auctions.
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Book building is the primary method through which initial public oerings (IPOs) are brought to the market
in the United States. The book building method gives the underwriter substantial discretion over allocations. A
number of papers have appeared in the academic literature showing that, under certain circumstances, the greater
control and ﬂexibility of the book building method that comes with that discretion can provide substantial beneﬁts
to issuers1. However, when agents are given discretion, there is always the potential for abuse, and the numerous
scandals following the internet bubble suggest that such abuses have occurred in practice2. Thus it appears that there
are both advantages and disadvantages to the discretion that is given to underwriters by the book building method. 3
An ongoing debate in the academic literature examines whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages, es-
pecially when compared to sealed bid auctions that give little discretion to underwriters. Auctions are relatively more
transparent, giving little discretion to the auction administrator, and are consequently less subject to manipulation and
abuse4. The auction method is old and well established, and has been particularly successful for government debt,
particularly US Treasury securities.
In this paper we provide a comparative review of international IPO practices, and the factors that inﬂuence the
choice of the IPO mechanism from the set of mechanisms consisting of various types of auctions, ﬁxed price public
oering, and book building5. In Section 2 we oer evidence on overall usage patterns – ﬁrst listing the many countries
that have tried and abandoned the auction method, and then examining IPO auction outcomes in more detail. We ﬁnd
that, when standard auctions have had to compete with another method – either with ﬁxed price public oers or with
book building – auctions have lost out. Of the 50 countries that we examine, more than half have used the auction
method at some point, yet IPO auctions are still in use only in the US, where usage has been sporadic and relatively
rare, and in Vietnam, India and Israel, where there are (or until recently have been) restrictions preventing the use of
book building.
We present empirical evidence in Section 3 that suggests that the lack of popularity of auctions cannot be explained
either by lack of familiarity or by dierences in underwriting fees: auctions have initially been quite popular in many
countries, and the fees for ﬁxed price public oers in most of them have been the same as those for auctions, leaving
investment banks with no incentive to favor one method over the other based on fees. In spite of that, when issuers
have been allowed to choose between ﬁxed price public oers and auctions, the former method eventually prevailed6.
The ﬁxed price public oering method in turn lost market share when it faced competition from book building. Our
ﬁndings refute the popular view that, but for the investment banks’ market power, standard auctions would have
replaced the book building method for bringing new equity issues to the market7.
Our explanation for the popularity of the book building method relies on the observation that book building can
be thought of as a “direct” (“truth-telling”) mechanism, that requires little sophistication on the part of participants. In
contrast, bidding in IPO auctions requires a high degree of sophistication on the part of all the bidders. In addition to
valuing the shares being issued, each bidder must assess how many other bidders there will be, how much information
they have, and what bidding strategies they will use, while at the same time accounting for the mistakes those other
1See Benveniste and Spindt(1989) and Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) onstructuring oers to induce thereporting of information, and Sherman
and Titman (2002) on inducing information production. Ritter and Welch (2002), Ljungqvist (2007), Wilhelm (2005) oer reviews of the academic
IPO literature.
2See Loughran and Ritter (2004) for discussion of the scandals and overall trends in IPO underwriting.
3Lowry et al. (2010) bring in a dierent perspective: They argue that, ”underwriters’ diculty in valuing companies characterized by high
uncertainty, raise serious questions about the ecacy of the traditional ﬁrm-commitment IPO process,” and conjecture that, ”alternate mechanisms,
such as auctions, could be beneﬁcial for ﬁrms that value price discovery over the auxiliary services provided by underwriters.”
4The Salomon Treasury bond scandal of 1991 suggests that auctions may not be immune to manipulation
5We describe each method, and the primary dierences between them, in more detail below in Appendix A
6The only exception that we know of is France, which used a unique auction method that discouraged free riders.
7Examples include ”IPO Market Comes Back to Life”, by Rachel Emma Silverman. Wall Street Journal, New York, N.Y.:Nov 11, 2003. pg.
D.1. ”Dutch auction IPO scheme grabs insider interest”, The Red Herring (www.redherring.com), October 30, 2003. ”BofI Holding Has Textbook
Auction IPO”, 15 March 2005, Dow Jones News Service. In fact, some have even argued that U.S. issuers should be forced to use auctions (see for
example, ”The Value of Trust,” Economist Sta, The Economist, June 07, 2002.) The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission asked for public
comments on whether issuers should be forced to use auctions, since few have so far been willing to use them voluntarily. Forced action usage has
been tried in, for example, Japan, Israel, and Vietnam.
3bidders may be potentially making – and all that makes bidding in an IPO auction a demanding task8.
As is well known, bidders in a common value setting face the “winner’s curse”, and need to adjust for this by
shaving their bids. This adjustment depends, among other things, on the number and behavior of other investors
who enter the auction. If bidders do not know how many will participate, how much they know, and how they will
bid, unpleasant surprises are inevitable. Auctions that, by chance, happen to have an unexpectedly large number of
entrants will on average be grossly oversubscribed and overpriced, while those that have an unexpectedly low number
of participants may be left undersubscribed. These factors are dicult to predict and control, and such variation is an
example of what we call “structural risk”: that is, the risk that arises due to uncertainty about the bidding environment,
rather than about the actual value of shares.
As we illustrate in Section 4, when bidders adjust their bids to account for such risk they underprice the issue
much further, which is costly for the issuer. The fact that each IPO is for an entirely dierent stock with possibly
unique characteristics increases the complexity of the bidding environment, thereby making bidding mistakes even
more likely. We illustrate the high potential for mistakes in such cases with an example in Section 4.4. As we show,
bidders who make unanticipated mistakes, in addition to suering potentially large losses, can in addition impose costs
on other bidders9. Further, there may also be naive bidders, whose mistakes may drive up the price of shares above
their fair value10. Thus, we argue that book building is popular primarily because it is less vulnerable to mistakes
on the part of participants, so long as the underwriter is trusted by the investors. Similarly, the ﬁxed price method
too requires much less sophistication from bidders when compared to auctions, since it eliminates the risk that the
issue price may be unexpectedly high or low due to bidders’ mistakes11. Further, ﬁxed price public oerings are more
transparent and less reliant on the underwriter’s reputation when compared to book building, and hence may have an
advantage in countries where it may be dicult for underwriters to establish sucient reputation.
In Section 5 we show how these issues played a role in the failure of some IPO auctions. We provide additional
anecdotal evidence for the lack of popularity of IPO auctions, and investigate in greater detail IPO auctions in Sin-
gapore. We also discuss the dierences between IPO auctions and auctions for Treasury bonds and why the latter
have been successful. We believe that the evidence we present makes the lack of popularity of IPO auctions less of a
puzzle. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Global Patterns and the Surprising Rarity of IPO Auctions
When Margaret Thatcher, Prime Minister of the UK, began privatizing British companies, she set o major
changes around the world in government, in industries and in IPO methods. Before then, the IPO method in most
countries outside the US was ﬁxed price public oers (a.k.a. open oers, universal oers or often simply called “the
IPO method”). The trend towards ﬂoating extremely large public companies forced countries to try new methods and
to coordinate IPOs across borders, since many privatizations were too big to be absorbed entirely by the local market.
The wave of privatizations led to experimentation ﬁrst with auctions and then with the US book building method.
Before we proceed with our investigation of international IPO experience, we will ﬁrst describe the existing
methods and their deﬁning features.
2.1. IPO Mechanisms: Fixed Price Public Oers, Book Building, and Auctions
In ﬁxed price public oers, the price and allocation rules are set before information on demand is received, and
shares are allocated according to the rules announced earlier.
With book building, the underwriter typically arranges for investors to attend a road show and then collects indi-
cations of interest, which are used to build the order book. The oering price is set only after the order book is full,
8Nonequilibrium bidding, and its eects such as persistent winner’s curse, has received high-proﬁle attention in recent auctions research, e.g.
Eyster and Rabin (2005) and Crawford and Iriberri (2007)
9The following quote of Munger from Poor Charlie’s Almanack (2006, page 18) suggests that even sophisticated investors may ﬁnd it dicult
to ﬁgure out how to bid: “The problem with closed bid auctions is that they are frequently won by people making a technical mistake, as in the case
with Shell paying double for Belridge Oil.” See also Dyer et al. (1989).
10Chiang, Qian and Sherman (2009a) ﬁnd evidence of return-chasing and other suboptimal bidding behavior by individual investors in IPO
auctions.
11There is still some winner’s curse in ﬁxed price public oerings since the allocation depends on how many others bid.
4giving the underwriter some idea of demand. The underwriter has substantial discretion over allocations, with those
customers who helped in pricing the issue and those with long term relationships with the underwriter getting more
favorable treatment.
Auctions for IPOs have taken several forms. Uniform price auctions, often mistakenly called Dutch or Vickrey
auctions, are multi-unit sealed bid auctions in which all winning bidders pay the same price. The price paid may be the
market-clearing price (the highest price that allows all shares to be sold), or it may be below the clearing price, leading
to increased rationing. A ”dirty” IPO auction is a uniform price auction where they ”leave something on the table”
by pricing below market-clearing. In a discriminatory or pay-what-you-bid auction, each winning bidder pays his or
her own bid. While some auctions restrict entry, historically most IPO auctions have been of an open public nature.
The auction price is based on investor bids, but unlike book building, auction allocations are usually determined by
rules that are set, and publicly announced, prior to bidding, thus eliminating underwriter discretion with respect to
allocations.
With either ﬁxed price public oers or sealed bid auctions, underwriters may, and sometimes do, hold road shows
before the oer price is set. As in book building, they are allowed to ask for feedback that may inﬂuence the oering
price in the case of the ﬁxed price oer and the reservation price in the case of auctions. However, without control
over allocations, underwriters may not be able to oer enough of an incentive for investors to produce and share
information.
Many countries have used hybrids – combinations of any two of the three methods. There have been hybrid
auction/public oer and auction/book building IPOs, but the most common combination is book building/public oer.
For most hybrids, book building (or sometimes an auction) is used to set the price and to allocate shares to institutional
and foreign investors, while a ﬁxed price public oer tranche is reserved for local retail investors that do not participate
in the price-setting process. Hybrid book building/auctions on the exchange are used in Chile because of regulations,
but the oer price is set through book building12.
There are two types of hybrids: simultaneous and sequential. With sequential hybrids, the price-setting tranche
(usually book building but possibly an auction) is completed ﬁrst, so that the price from that tranche can be used for
the subsequent ﬁxed price public oer. See Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) for a model of the eects of setting IPO
prices too far in advance. Simultaneous hybrids are often called ’open pricing’, since investors have to place orders
while the oer price is still ’open’ (before the ﬁnal price is set). This allows both tranches to run at the same time,
thus allowing the oer price to be set as late as possible. A key reason why the upper end of the price range is so
frequently binding outside the US is that pricing above the upper end would require returning all orders in the retail
tranche and restarting the subscription period with the new range. This problem does not occur in the US because it
is practically the only country that uses pure rather than hybrid book building.
From the point of view of the mechanism-design literature, commonly used uniform-price and discriminatory
auctions are examples of indirect mechanisms, in which truth-telling (i.e. correctly reporting own estimates of the
value of shares) is generally not optimal. In contrast, direct mechanisms have bidders report their valuations to the
auctioneer (underwriter), and provide them with incentives so that it is optimal to do so truthfully. In practice such
a mechanism can look very much like book building, with bidders privately communicating their valuations to the
underwriter, and the underwriter setting prices and allocations in a way that provides them with sucient incentives
to report.
It is well known that for a large set of mechanisms, the Revelation Principle (Myerson, 1981) states that for any
indirect mechanism, there exists a direct one that generates identical outcomes in model economies. Interestingly,
there is evidence showing that the outcomes of theoretically equivalent direct and indirect mechanisms dier in labo-
ratory experiments13. Whether this is an important enough issue in the case of IPOs can only be discerned based on
the historical experience of countries that have experimented with several dierent mechanisms for IPOs.
12Pension funds may only purchase shares through an exchange in Chile, so some IPO shares are sold on the ﬂoor of the exchange, after the
oering price has been set and the rest of the shares have been allocated through book building. Such auctions may occur only minutes before
general trading on the same ﬂoor. In its 2003 IPO, La Polar canceled the auction completely and distributed its shares through a book build and
through brokerages.
13See e.g. Masatlioglu and Uler (2005)
52.2. International Historical Evidence
We conduct an extensive study of IPO placement practices in 50 countries. Unfortunately there is no standard
reliable source of international data on IPO placement methods14. Table 1 summarizes the IPO methods used in each
country, with more detailed information given in Table C.1. As one can see in these tables, most countries allow the
use of many methods. We do not know of any country that had formerly allowed auctions and then changed their
regulations to prohibit or limit them, or of any country that has forced issuers to use book building – the general trend
in the last two decades has been to allow greater choice among issuers.
There are two notable patterns. First, the book building method was once rare outside the US but is now common.
Second, auctions have been tried in more than 25 countries but are rare today.
Table 1 shows that the traditional method (in other words, the ﬁrst and for many years the only method) in most
countries is ﬁxed price public oer. It also shows that nearly all countries except the United States are still using ﬁxed
price public oer in some form, either alone or as part of a book building hybrid. As a rough generalization, Table 1
shows that experimentation with auctions began in the 1980s or earlier in Europe, and in the 1990s or later in Asia and
the Americas, but the auction method generally was dropped within a few years. Experimentation with book building
exploded in the mid-1990s, and the method seems to have ’stuck’ in most countries, again as a hybrid with ﬁxed price
public oer. Auctions usually were abandoned before book building was introduced, so that there have only been a
few countries in which both methods were in use at the same time.
Although auctions have been used in more than half of the 50 countries listed in Table 1, the method seems to
have been entirely abandoned in all but four of them. As can be seen in Table C.1, auctions are used sporadically in
the US, at a rate of about 2 per year (22 from 1999-2009). They are used frequently in Vietnam and India, but both
countries prohibit book building. They have been frequently used in the past in Israel, where auctions were the only
allowed method for a decade. Book building has been allowed in Israel since mid-2007, but the market has not been
active since that regulatory change, so it is too early to tell how the choice of issue methods will evolve there.
In India, book building was ﬁrst allowed in the 1990s but was not popular for many years. Eventually, after
regulatory changes, book building became more popular there, but in 2005 the Indian regulator15 began mandating
pro-rata allocation among bidders. Although India still labels its method book building, the method is now a uniform
price auction, with no allocation discretion. Book building is eectively banned, but ﬁxed price public oers are still
allowed and auctions have so far remained the favored method.
Auctions are also being used regularly in Vietnam, but issuers there are allowed no choice of methods. Vietnam is
still developing its markets in its transition away from central planning, and most IPOs are privatizations.
In France, auctions were popular in the ﬁrst half of the 1990s. On the regulated exchanges, they gradually lost
market share to sequential hybrid book building over several years, then dried up quickly in 1999 when simultaneous
hybrid book building was allowed. Auctions continued to be used on the unregulated over-the-counter market (the
Marche Libre or Free Market) for several more years, although they eventually seem to have dried up there, also.
There were, however, two IPO auctions in France in early 200516, which came after there had been no auctions on
regulated French exchanges for half a decade.
Auctions were the only method allowed in Israel for a decade. The law requiring their use expired in December,
2003, after which issuers were allowed to eectively choose a ﬁxed price oering by setting a maximum price for
the auction. Many of the IPOs between 2004 and mid-2007 chose to set a relatively low maximum price for their
oerings, thus eectively choosing ﬁxed price over auction17. In July 2007, a long-debated change went into eect,
14SDC Platinum oers the currently most extensive international IPO database. It includes indicators of placement and pricing techniques, but
unfortunately these are missing for a large part of the dataset, and worse, are rather unreliable in terms of describing the actual process: e.g. auctions
in Taiwan, Singapore and France are inconsistently classiﬁed as either ﬁxed price or book building; on the other hand, many book built issues in
US and UK are classiﬁed as ﬁxed price, etc.
15see SEBI Circular #SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9
16The two 2005 auctions were for Cafom, on the Second Marche in January and for MG International, on Alternext in June. There have been no
further auctions in France as of the end of July, 2007.
17The law for one decade had forbidden the use of a maximum price. Technically, Israel was using auctions even before this, but it had become
standard to set the maximum price so low that it was virtually sure to be hit, thus eectively making the method a ﬁxed price method. In 2007,
Itamar Medical, Maayan Ventures, Clal Finance and Brainsway all set maximum prices for their IPOs, and all ended up being priced at those
maximums, but we have not yet been able to verify what proportion of all TASE IPOs set maximum prices.
6Table 1: Summary of IPO Methods Used in Various Countries.
A blank in any column means that, to the best of our knowledge, the method was not used. The “ﬁrst introduced” years
are the earliest years that we were able to ﬁnd but may be later than the actual year of ﬁrst use. On whether the book
building method is now dominant or gaining in popularity, the answer is in the judgment of the main source listed in Ta-
ble C1, or our best estimate if no other source was available. News article sources for any country are available upon request.
Traditional First  Apparently First Now dominant  Hybrid with
 method(s) introduced abandoned introduced or gaining? Fixed Price
Europe
Czech Republic Fixed price 2004 yes yes
Finland Fixed price 1993 yes yes
France Auctions, fixed price 1964 1999* 1993 yes yes
Germany Fixed price 1999 1995 yes yes
Greece Fixed price 1994 yes yes
Hungary Fixed price 1995 yes yes
Ireland Fixed price 1992 yes yes
Italy Fixed price 1980s 1986 1992 yes yes
Netherlands Fixed price 1980s 1989 1994 yes yes
Norway Fixed price 1995 yes yes
Poland Fixed price 1994 1995 1995 yes yes
Portugal Fixed price 1987 1992* 1995 yes yes
Spain Fixed price 1988 1993 yes yes
Sweden Fixed price 1980s 1980s 1994 yes yes
Switzerland Fixed price Mid-1980s 1987 1995 yes yes
United Kingdom Fixed price 1960 1986 1992 yes yes
N. & S. America
Argentina Fixed price 1991 1992 1993 yes yes
Barbados Fixed price Never
Brazil Fixed price Late 1980s 1994 1992 yes yes
Canada Book building Early yes yes
Mexico Fixed price None yet yes
Paraguay Fixed price Never
Peru Fixed price 1996 yes yes
United States Book building 1999 Still using Early yes no
Asia/Pacific
Australia Fixed price 1999 1999 1993 yes yes
Bangladesh Fixed price Allowed, 2009 Never
China Fixed price 1999 2002 2005* yes yes
Hong Kong Fixed price 1994 yes yes
India Fixed price 2005* Still using 1999 Banned, 2005 yes
Indonesia Fixed price 2000 yes yes
Japan Fixed price 1989 1997 1997 yes yes
Korea Fixed price 1993 1997 yes yes
Malaysia Fixed price 1992 1994 2002 yes yes
New Zealand Fixed price 1997 yes yes
Philippines Fixed price 1994 1994 1998 yes yes
Singapore Fixed price 1991 1994 1999 yes yes
Sri Lanka Fixed price Never
Taiwan Fixed price 1995 2003 2004 yes yes
Thailand Fixed price 1994 yes yes
Vietnam Auctions 2005 Still using Never
Africa/Middle East
Egypt Fixed price 2000 yes
Kenya Fixed price 2008 yes
Israel Auctions, fixed price By 1980 ?* 2008
Jordan Fixed price Never
Pakistan Fixed price Never
South Africa Fixed price 1994 yes
Turkey Fixed price 1994 1995* 1997 yes
*Some unusual features or exceptions.  See Table C.1 for more detail.
Auctions Book Building
7allowing book building for the ﬁrst time. It is too soon at this point to tell how auctions will compete with book
building in the Israeli market.
In Latin America, auctions have been used in Argentina, Brazil and Peru in the past. Latin American markets
were quiet for many years, with delistings outnumbering listings in Brazil, Argentina and Chile18. Thus it was hard
to predict if auctions were gone completely. However, Brazilian, Chilean and later Argentinean IPO markets began
picking up in 2004-2005, with even stronger activity in 2006, and book building has been the dominant method, with
no auctions that we know of.
Since 1995, Taiwan has allowed both auctions and book building, in addition to the traditional ﬁxed price public
oers. Taiwan’s auctions are similar to those that were once required, and are still allowed, in Japan – sequential
hybrids in which discriminatory (pay-what-you-bid) auctions are followed by ﬁxed price public oers. Auctions were
initially popular but lost market share over time, with more and more issuers returning to pure ﬁxed price public oers.
Book building was originally allowed only in certain restrictive circumstances but has gained popularity in the last
few years.
In the US, the investment bank WR Hambrecht has been encouraging issuers to use auctions since mid-1999.
The method got much publicity when Google, a popular search engine company, chose to use the auction method
for its August, 2004 IPO, but still the auction method is not popular in the US. As of 2009, there have been 22 US
IPO auctions, 19 of them lead-underwritten by WR Hambrecht through its OpenIPO method. Of the other 3 US IPO
auctions, the lead underwriters were: Credit Suisse and Morgan Stanley for Google in 2004; Credit Suisse for Netsuite
in 2007; and Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch for Rackspace in 2008. US auctions have had some
unusual features (see the “United States” column of Table C.1, p.54).
Several types of IPO auctions have been used. Brazil, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and the
UK have used discriminatory auctions, while Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Finland, France, India, Israel, Malaysia,
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Singapore, Turkey, the UK, the US and Vietnam have used
uniform price auctions. Dirty (priced below market clearing) auctions have been used in Australia, Belgium, Finland,
France, Hungary, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Turkey, the UK, and the US.
Thus out of 50 countries, auctions have been tried in more than half, and yet all except India, Israel, Vietnam and
the US seem to have abandoned them entirely, and auctions are rare or mandatory even in these last four countries.
Book building is gaining in popularity or is already the dominant method in more than 40 of the countries. Fixed price
public oer is still used in smaller countries and for smaller oerings, and is used for the retail tranche of hybrids,
which are standard.
Naturally, one question that needs investigating is what drives the choice of the placement mechanism: as we
explore in much greater detail in Appendix A and Section 4, we expect methods that rely upon investors’ and
underwriters’ mutual reputation and relative sophistication to be more popular in more established markets with
more sophisticated investors. Using the World Competitiveness Report (2009) Business Sophistication and Financial
Sophistication indices as proxies for the market development, we estimated two simple logistic choice models.
Table 2 presents a logistic model of choice of whether to experiment with bookbuilding in a particular country.
We can see that higher business sophistication is associated with a higher likelihood that at least some issuers will
experiment with bookbuilding. Also, this likelihood is higher in larger, more ﬁnancially sophisticated markets.
Table 3 shows results from a simple logistic model predicting the most common IPO placement method, that con-
ﬁrms this hypothesis – bookbuilding is much more popular in larger countries with established ﬁnancial markets and
relatively sophisticated participants, while ﬁxed price issues are strongly associated with less sophisticated markets.
Auctions and hybrids (here including bookbuilt/ﬁxed price hybrids) are not strongly associated with either measure.
If bookbuilding is a version of a “direct” mechanism such results are to be expected, since, as we shall see below,
implementing such a mechanism requires an established, trusted and sophisticated underwriter, communicating with
investors who have sucient capacity to collect and process information. Lacking these conditions, the potential
beneﬁts of bookbuilding disappear and simple ﬁxed price issues become more attractive due to their simplicity and
lesser reliance on the reputation of the underwriter. Hybrids can be ﬁne-tuned to speciﬁc market conditions and are
therefore observed in a wide range of markets.
18For example, Chile had no IPOs at all from 1998 to 2001 and only one each in the years 2002 and 2003.
8Table 2: Business Sophistication and Experience with IPO Methods
Dependent variable = 1 if bookbuilding has ever been used in a country; zero otherwise. Logistic regression coecients reported; z-statistics in
parentheses. Financial sophistication and total market sophistication (deﬁned as the average of ﬁnancial and business sophistication) score as per
Global Competitiveness Report (2009).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Business soph. 3.229 3.135
(2.58) (2.28)




Market size 1.522 2.230 1.828
(1.80) (2.43) (2.11)
Constant -12.09 -17.93 -6.134 -23.97 -21.36
(-2.33) (-2.52) (-1.74) (-2.24) (-2.41)
N 46 46 46 46 46
pseudo R2 0.409 0.554 0.180 0.543 0.563
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
Table 3: Market Sophistication and Prevalence of Bookbuilding
Dependent variable = 1 if the corresponding method is currently the most commonly used; zero otherwise. Logistic regression coecients reported;
z-statistics in parentheses. Financial sophistication and total market sophistication (deﬁned as the average of ﬁnancial and business sophistication)
score as per World Competitiveness Report (2009).
Fixed Fixed Bookbuild Bookbuild Hybrid Auction
Financial soph. -1.317 2.735
(-2.51) (2.36)
Total soph. -1.726 5.285 -0.245 0.692
(-2.82) (2.15) (-0.28) (1.44)
Market size -0.662 -0.434 2.178 2.064 0.371 -0.235
(-1.66) (-1.11) (2.51) (2.15) (0.58) (-0.72)
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46
Pseudo R2 0.170 0.214 0.434 0.532 0.017 0.038
t statistics in parentheses
 p < 0:05,  p < 0:01,  p < 0:001
3. Problems with Popular Explanations
In what follows we discuss several commonly oered explanations for the lack of popularity of IPO auctions, and
argue that they are not fully consistent with observed global evidence.
3.1. Were Issuers Unwilling to Try a New Method?
One possible explanation for the low numbers of IPO auctions in the US is that the auction method is simply too
new and experimental, and that issuers are afraid to try an unproven method. This is plausible, since an IPO is a
very expensive, very public step for a company, so issuers may not be anxious to experiment. However, this ‘lack
of familiarity’ argument cannot explain the overall rejection of the auction method around the world. First, the mere
fact that IPO auctions have been used in nearly half the countries for which we have information implies that quite a
few issuers have been willing to experiment. More importantly, if we look at relative usage patterns over time, issuers
have been most enthusiastic about IPO auctions when the method was new, and they generally became less willing to
use it after they had become more familiar with the method.
Figure 1 shows the relative auction usage patterns over time in four countries. For Singapore, Taiwan and Turkey,
the main alternative method was ﬁxed price public oers, which had been the traditional method in those countries.
9Figure 1: How Auctions Evolved over Time in Four Countries
In each graph, the X’s (right axis; connected by dashed lines) give the number of total IPOs per year in that country, while the diamonds (left axis;
connected by solid lines) are the percentages of IPO auctions out of all IPOs.
Sources: A: E-mail from the Stock Exchange of Singapore, October, 1999. B: The data was given to us by K.C. John Wei. See Liu et al. (2001)
and, for 2002-2003 data, Hsu and Hung (2005). C: E-mail from the Istanbul Stock Exchange, March, 1999. D: Derrien and Womack (2003) and
Chahine (2001). E: Euronext website (www.Euronext.com, in IPO Archives).
10Auctions were ﬁrst allowed in 1993 in Singapore19 and Turkey, and in 1995 in Taiwan. In France, both auctions and
ﬁxed price public oers had been used for decades, but sequential hybrid book building was ﬁrst introduced in the
1990s, while standard book building was only allowed beginning in 1999.
As can be seen from Figure 1 for the three countries in which the IPO auction method was newly introduced,
auctions captured their greatest market share early on, with two-thirds or more of issuers choosing to use auctions
when they were relatively new. As issuers became more familiar with the method over time, a lower proportion of
them chose to use the auction method. Hence, it is hard to argue that, in these countries, the disappearance of IPO
auctions was due to lack of familiarity or to an unwillingness of issuers to try a new method.
Of the four countries whose usage patterns are shown in Figure 1, France diers from the others in several ways.
First, the auction method had been allowed for several decades in France. Second, a form of book building was in
use during the period shown, in addition to auctions and ﬁxed price. Last, the disappearance of auctions from the
regulated exchanges seems to have been driven by a regulatory shift that allowed greater choice.
Derrien and Womack (2003) found that sequential hybrid book building was less ecient than auctions in France
due to the requirement that the price be set too far in advance. Before 1999, the only form of hybrid book building
that was allowed in France was a sequential hybrid, where the price must be set in advance to allow time for the public
to place their orders. As the modeling in Chowdhry and Sherman (1996a) demonstrates, setting prices too early adds
risk, leading to higher levels of underpricing. Once the more modern, simultaneous hybrid book building method was
allowed in France in 1999, auctions quickly vanished from the regulated exchanges20. The 1999 regulatory change
seems to explain the timing of auctions drying up on the French regulated exchanges, although it does not explain
why they were still used for several more years on the unregulated over-the-counter Free Market (Marche Libr´ e).
Eventually, as shown in Figure 1 (Panel E), auctions also dried up on the Free Market.
One obvious question is whether issuers in these countries were truly allowed to choose freely between IPO
methods. Although there were no regulatory restrictions that prevented issuers from using auctions, strong dierences
between the groups of issuers using dierent methods might imply some other sort of barrier, such as underwriter
reluctance to underwrite auctions for some issuers. Therefore, in unreported analysis (available on request), we
compare ﬁxed price public oers and auctions in Singapore, Turkey and on the French Free Market based on both
industry and amount of funds raised21. We did not ﬁnd substantial dierences in the size or industry patterns of auction
and non-auction issues.
Thus it is clear, in all four of the countries shown in Figure 1, that the disappearance of auctions was not due to
issuers’ lack of familiarity with the auction method. Similarly in Japan, issuers were forced to use auctions from 1989
to 1997. In spite of the long period during which IPOs in Japan were accomplished exclusively through auctions, the
method was abandoned as soon as issuers were given the option of instead using book building.
There is not enough evidence to conclusively reject the ‘lack of familiarity’ argument for all countries. It may
explain why auctions have not caught on in countries with limited usage, such as Germany, Australia or the US, or
in countries that have never tried auctions at all. It may also explain why open public auctions for corporate debt
and seasoned equity never caught on22, even though there was a race between three investment banks to introduce
online corporate bond auction platforms in 200023, and WR Hambrecht oers an online seasoned equity auction
method known as OpenFollowOn24. But the overall IPO evidence is that issuers in many countries have been willing
19The graph shows only uniform price auctions for Singapore. Singapore also had one discriminatory auction in 1991 and one in 1992. Uniform
price auctions were ﬁrst allowed in 1993.
20With the exception of the two IPO auctions in 2005 that were mentioned in Section I.
21Comparisons of French Second and Nouveau oerings can be found in Derrien and Womack (2003) and Degeorge, Derrien and Womack
(2007). Hsu and Hung (2005) compare Taiwan IPOs by method.
22Bortolotti et al. (2006) show that auctions, in the form of block trades, have increased dramatically in the last decade and have become quite
common around the world for seasoned equity oerings. The success of these SEO auctions ﬁts well with our ﬁndings for IPOs, since the block
trade auctions are single-unit auctions among a small group of sophisticated buyers – investment banks. The investment bank that wins the auction
buys all of the shares at the winning bid price and then resells them on the market. With only one buyer, there is no room for free riders. Because
the shares are relatively easy to value (since they are already trading) and the number of potential bidders is relatively small, these auctions are
closer to Treasury bill auctions than to the types of auctions that have been used for IPOs.
23On August 10 2000, Deutsche Bank and Bear Stearns each auctioned o their own debt on their newly-developed platforms, while WR
Hambrecht held its ﬁrst OpenBook debt auction, for Dow, on August 15, 2000. WR Hambrecht handled a second OpenBook auction, for Ford
Motor Credit, in March, 2001. It reportedly also attempted an auction for Dayton Hudson, but the bid-taking system crashed during the auction.
24Overstock, a company that also went public through an OpenIPO, used the OpenFollowon method in May of 2004 but chose a traditional
marketed oering for its next follow-on in November, 2004.
11to experiment with both auctions and book building, and that issuers became less likely to choose auctions as they
gained familiarity with the method.
3.2. Underwriter Pressure for Using the Bookbuilding Method
Another explanation suggested by Ausubel (2002) for the failure of issuers to use IPO auctions is that investment
banks have pressured issuers to use book building rather than auctions because the fees, and hence proﬁts, are higher
for book building. This argument is somewhat inconsistent – it assumes that underwriters have sucient market power
to keep book building fees artiﬁcially high, and sucient power to force issuers to use the book building method in
spite of the high fees, but that they do not have sucient power to demand artiﬁcially high fees for auctions25.
Regardless, this argument cannot explain the disappearance of auctions in most countries, because auctions have
usually been replaced by ﬁxed price public oers, and public oer fees are typically as low as, or even lower than,
the fees for auctions. Ljungqvist et al. (2003) show that average fees tend to be quite low for ﬁxed price public oers
across most countries, substantially below those for book building26.
A third explanation to consider is that underwriters might be pressuring issuers to use methods that lead to higher
initial returns, so that the underwriters can allocate the underpriced shares to their favored clients. This cannot explain
the choice between auctions and ﬁxed price public oers, since neither method allows the underwriter to control
allocations27.
3.3. Do Issuers Prefer the Method that Minimizes Expected Underpricing?
The magnitude of underpricing is often mentioned as a disadvantage of the book building method28. However,
underpricing in ﬁxed price oers tends to be larger than underpricing under either auctions or book building29. In
spite of that, we ﬁnd that the ﬁxed price public oer method has been favored over auctions, when both were allowed.
In addition, there are several reasons to believe that issuers care about other aspects of the process beyond just
the magnitude of underpricing as evidenced by initial returns. For example, one reason to go public is to give current
stockholders such as the founders, venture capitalists and angel investors a chance to diversify by liquidating at
least part of their holdings. Such investors usually cannot sell until the end of the lock up period and thus care
about the eventual stock price as well as the oer price and ﬁrst day’s trading price. If a deep, liquid market is not
established, those investors may be unable to sell their shares at a reasonable price, even after the time and expense
of an IPO. Companies that go public but do not attract a following may end up being ignored and stuck in the so-
called Orphanage30. If they do not attract an institutional investor following, they will generally not be covered by
analysts and will not be monitored closely enough to be accurately priced. This means that they will be unable to do
follow-on equity oerings and will tend to trade at a substantial discount, due to their illiquidity and added risk. In
order to minimize this possibility, ﬁrms may be willing to pay, through underpricing, to attract the attention of serious
investors in the IPO31. This may explain the importance of analyst coverage found in Loughran and Ritter (2004), Cli
25A related argument is given by Degeorge et al. (2007), who show a correlation in France between greater publicity/analyst attention for IPOs
and the use of book building rather than an auction (they do not analyze the ﬁxed price public oers in their sample). They argue that underwriters
induced issuers to use book building by convincing them of the value of other services (more analyst attention) but do not explain why such services
would be bundled only with book building, rather than with all three methods in use at the time.
26Similarly, Chahine (2001), examining French data from 1996 to 2000, found that the mean, median and standard deviation of gross spreads
were slightly lower for ﬁxed price than for auctions. In most countries, when auctions were ﬁrst used, the fees were the same for auctions as for
ﬁxed price public oers.
27Many countries allow orders in ﬁxed price public oers to be favored on the basis of order size, but this usually involves favoring small over
large orders. Chowdhry and Sherman (1996b) show that favoring small orders may reduce the Rock (1986) winner’s curse. Parlour and Rajan
(2005) also examine rationing in IPOs.
28Although, as we show in Section 5.1, the evidence on whether auctions lead to less underpricing relative to book building is mixed and
inconclusive.
29See Ljungqvist et al. (2003).
30Orphan stocks are also known as wallﬂowers. See Barron’s Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms.
31Underpricing as a way of inducing costly evaluation has been modeled in Sherman (1992), Chemmanur (1993), Booth and Chua (1996),
Sherman (2000), Sherman and Titman (2002) and Busaba and Chang (2003). Yung (2005) models costly evaluation by both investors and the
underwriter. Cornelli and Goldreich (2001), Jenkinson and Jones (2004)) and Cornelli and Goldreich (2003) oer evidence on whether or not
book building performs this role in practice. See Sherman and Titman (2002) for a list of additional reasons why issuers may prefer more accurate
pricing.
12and Denis (2004) and Mola et al. (2010). In the words of Martin Manley, Chairman and CEO of Alibris32, “Taking a
company public is like getting a heart transplant: you only do it once and you need it to be done very, very well. It is
not a decision driven by price.”
This brings up the question of what objective function issuers are maximizing when choosing an IPO method.
Loughran and Ritter (2004); Sherman and Titman (2002); Sherman (2005), and Chemmanur and Liu (2003) oer
alternative objective functions that consider more than just maximizing proceeds. The appropriate objective function
for IPO issuers is a subject in itself, and one worthy of future research. In this paper, we simply note that the evidence
indicates that issuers care about more than just maximizing the expected proceeds from the IPO33
4. Why Do Issuers Avoid Auctions?
While popular explanations for the the success of the book building method are not convincing, for reasons we
discussed in Section 3, not all academics have been convinced by the arguments made in favor of book building in
the theoretical ﬁnance literature either. This is presumably based on the view that it is possible to design a uniform
price hybrid auction that can to a large extent match what book building can achieve when it comes to rewarding
price discovery through underpricing the IPO, and promoting wider distribution of the IPO shares. The scepticism of
some of the academics is reﬂected in the following observation by Ausubel (2002): ”Imagine attempting to explain
to a visitor, from another era or another planet, the economic rationale behind various institutions in the American
economy at the start of the twenty-ﬁrst century. Few practices seem more dicult to justify to the outsider than the
current procedure for the issuance of equity securities.”
We therefore examine the basis for this scepticism in Appendix A by comparing two speciﬁc mechanisms for
bringing out new equity issues. We model both book building and a hybrid auction, where, the hybrid auction is a
standard uniform price auction with a non-competitive tranche. We ﬁnd that in the example economy of Appendix
A, the level of underpricing as well as price discovery (amount of information revealed) depends only on the number
of informed participants in the hybrid uniform price auction. In contrast, in book building, for a given number of
participants, a range of underpricing can be supported. That is because, unlike in the hybrid auction, the allocations
can also be varied based on the informed bids. Hence, in general, the book building process can support a lower level
of underpricing for the same number of informed investors who participate in the issue when compared to the hybrid
auction.
However, this advantage becomes less important when information gathering costs are suciently high. For
example, suppose information gathering costs are such that only N informed bidders enter the hybrid auction, i.e., the
auction underpricing is such that there is no incentive for the N+1st investor to incur the costs necessary to become
informed. Suppose the lower bound on allocations to the uninformed is binding. In that case the auction outcome can
not be improved upon by book building in the example economy we consider, i.e., it will in general not be possible to
have better price discovery while at the same time keeping the underpricing lower. That suggests that at least under
certain conditions auctions may have an advantage over book building because of their transparency. Hence, it would
be dicult to explain the extent to which book building has come to be the dominant IPO mechanism in practice based
only on the reasons that have been advanced in the theoretical ﬁnance literature.
In this section, we therefore argue in favor of a dierent reason for the apparent lack of popularity of IPO auc-
tions. Unlike book building which is a direct mechanism where truth telling may be optimal, auctions are indirect
mechanisms, and participants in auctions require both knowledge of the environment and sophistication on the part of
all the participants. Because of that there are diculties in making auctions work in practice. As Vohra (2001) notes,
“A direct mechanism places a huge computational burden upon the auctioneer”, and the rules are hard to specify ex-
plicitly – especially when all possible uncertainty about the environment is taken into account. On the other hand, in
an indirect mechanism the computational burden is shifted to every participant, and every one of the participants has
to be as sophisticated as the auctioneer of the equivalent direct mechanism, which is dicult to achieve in practice.
32Alibris held an IPO auction through WR Hambrecht in May, 2004, but canceled it after observing the bids. See Mr. Manley’s blog, Jam Side
Down, at http://www.martinmanley.com/ipo diaries/.
33When the ﬁrm’s employees have a large number of options that are exercisable at the public oering price, the incentive may well be to
underprice the issue as much as possible subject to various constraints.
13As we noted earlier, auctions expose both the bidders and the issuer to risk from the variation in the number and
composition of bidders34. The problem is made worse by the complexity of the IPO environment, where it is easy
for participants to make mistakes that can impose large costs on all other participants as well, making other IPO
mechanisms more attractive. In what follows we illustrate these issues with suitably calibrated numerical examples.
4.1. Potential Problems with Auctions: Baseline Model
Consider a simple uniform-price auction: There are K lots of IPO shares oered for sale. Each lot consists of n
shares, where all shares have the same random, ex ante unknown value of V to everyone, with a common knowledge
prior G(V), with EV < 1, which is assumed to have a positive density everywhere on a compact support 
V  R+.
There are N identical bidders who compete for the allocations. Utility of a bidder who receives an allocation of x
shares at a price p is given by u(c0 + (V   p)x), where u is a strictly increasing, concave function, and c0 is his initial
capital. Without loss of generality, we normalize u(c0) = 0. The expected value of shares and expected utility are both
assumed to be ﬁnite: EV < 1, Eu(c0 + (V   p)x) < 1 8p 2 
V;0  x  1.
For expositional convenience we consider a unit-demand auction, where all K = 15 winning bidders receive
identical allocations of one lot of shares each, and all N   K losing bidders receive an allocation of 0.
We ﬁrst consider the case with zero information and transaction costs. Every bidder i, i = 1:::N receives condi-
tionally independent, identically distributed signals si about the true value V:
si  F(sijV) (1)
where F(sijV) is assumed to have a ﬁnite expectation and a strictly positive density over a compact support 
. Without
loss of generality, we impose a normalization Esi = V.
After observing their signals si, the agents submit their bids bi for one lot each. The agents’ strategy (or bidding
function) B(s) is the correspondence between their signals and bids: bi = Bi(si).
The auctioneer collects bids b = fb1:::bNg, determines the clearing price and allocates one (and only one) lot of
shares to every bidder whose bid is above the clearing price. An allocation without preferences and rationing implies
that the auction clearing price p 2 [b(K+1);b(K)] – i.e. p lies between the bids of K’th and (K + 1)’st agents35. For the
sake of argument, let p = b(K+1). Ties are broken at random (note that when the unconditional signal distribution has
no mass points and all bidders’ strategies are strictly increasing in their signals, a tie is a probability zero event).
An equilibrium allocation is such that for each bidder i his strategy Bi is the optimal response to the collection of
other bidders’ strategies.
This model, under assumptions of symmetry36, full rationality, identical priors and common knowledge of the
information structure, is analyzed in Milgrom (1981). It is useful to repeat some of the results from there, and to
demonstrate their quantitative implications.
Theorem 1. The above model has a unique symmetric equilibrium, where every bidder i has the same, strictly in-




















 i is the K’th highest signal of all agents other than i.
Proof. See Milgrom (1981).
34Endogenous entry into IPO auctions is modeled in Sherman (2005)
35Here and below, we use notation z(K) to denote K’th highest component of a vector z, and z i to denote a vector with i’th component dropped:
z i = fz1;z2;:::;zi 1;zi+1;:::;zNg
36Here meaning that the bidding functions of dierent participants are the same: Bi()  B() 8i
14In other words, agents can’t do better than bid under the assumption that they have received the lowest of the
winning signals. Note also that monotonicity of B also implies that B is strictly positive everywhere in the interior of

: in other words all N bidders submit bids in equilibrium.
As the number of bidders increases, the auction price asymptotically approaches the true value V, in other words,
the auction discount approaches zero (see Pesendorfer and Swinkels (1997) for a detailed analysis and a discussion of
the relevant assumptions).
In the numerical examples we examine, unless otherwise mentioned, we consider a hypothetical IPO with an ex
ante expected value of $15 million, split into K = 15 blocks of 100;000 shares each, where the share value V has a
lognormal distribution with E(V) = $10, and standard deviation of log(V) = 0:30 (i.e. corresponding to a standard
deviation of 30% for the continuously compounded rate of return to an uninformed investor in the stock). The private
signal si is centered at the actual share value, conditional on which it is also lognormal with a standard deviation
of 30%. The bidder pool consists of N potentially informed bidders37. In addition to the risk-neutral case, in order
to investigate the eects of bidders’ risk aversion, we will also consider constant relative risk aversion bidder utility
u(c) = c1 A
1 A, with initial capital of c0 calibrated to $30 million for each bidder.
4.1.1. Winner’s Curse and Bid Shaving
Figure 2 shows equilibrium bidding functions, depending on the number of participants in an auction. When
N = 2K so that number of winners is equal to the number of losers, bids are very close to the signals. However,
as the number of participants grows, so does the strength of the negative signal associated with winning the auction:
it now implies that the original bidders’ signal likely was in the right tail of the distribution and was overstating the
underlying share value (the so called “Winner’s Curse”). Consequently, bidders shave their bids. On the other hand,
when N < 2K so that there are more winners than losers, losing the auction is an indication of the signal biased
downwards (“Loser’s Curse”), and bidders adjust their bids upwards instead. The equilibrium of the uniform price
auction has the following characteristics:
4.1.2. Low Equilibrium Discount
Even with zero information, transaction and opportunity costs, an open auction does not completely eliminate
underpricing, which occurs due to the ﬁnite number of participants, and becomes larger when bidders are risk-averse.
The auction discount, depending on the number of participants and their degree of risk aversion, is shown in Figure
3. Note that, in this example, even when the number of participants is relatively small, the auction discount is low
when bidders are risk neutral (between 1% and 2% in the twice-subscribed case of N = 30).The discount can go up
substantially when bidders are suciently risk averse and ill diversiﬁed.
Aggregate uncertainty, which enters this model due to imperfect revelation of the true underlying value through a
limited number of noisy signals, increases the expected discounts, as one can see from Figure 4. For example, when
the standard deviation of the signal doubles, the underpricing in the twice-oversubscribed auction also doubles. As
the number of participants grows, price discovery improves, and both mean expected discount and their variance are
reduced (Figure 5).
4.2. Structural Risk in IPO Auctions
From the above results it may seem that wider auction participation must necessarily be in the interest of the issuer,
improving price discovery, increasing revenue and decreasing risk. However, in practice imprecise valuation is not
the only source of aggregate risk in auctions. Much of it comes from the features of the bidding environment itself,
such as the variation in the number and strategies of other bidders. This variation has historically been very high.
For example, when Japan auctioned o parts of its railway system, the 1993 auction of Japan Railway (JR) East
drew 18,670 bidders, while the 1996 auction of JR West drew only 3,395 bidders, a decrease of more than 80%.
335,000 JR West shares (20%) were left unsold. When Argentina auctioned o its ﬁrst telecommunications company,
Telefonica, in December, 1991, it hoped for at least 80,000 bids from local investors but received more than 100,000.
37In Appendix A we consider a hybrid uniform price auction with a noncompetitive tranche – with N = 2 informed bidders and  = 50
uninformed bidders, since the focus there is to compare the hybrid auction with book building. In contrast, in this section we focus on illustrating
the structural risk in auctions.
15Simulated Uniform-Price Auctions.
Allocations and discounts in simulated uniform-price unit-demand auctions. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the log of the value of a share and the log
of each signal about the value of the share are jointly normally distributed with V = S = 0:3 and EV = ES = 10. There are N participants, each
bidding for at most one lot of 100,000 shares, with the total of K = 15 lots oered. Except in Figure 3, all bidders are risk-neutral.
Figure 2: Bidding Functions
Equilibrium bid
as a function of signal for dierent numbers of risk-neutral participants N.












































Figure 3: Discount and Risk Aversion
Expected auction discount for dierent numbers of bidders N and
dierent risk aversion.












































Figure 4: Signal Quality and Discount
Equilibrium expected discount for dierent values of noise S and
number of risk-neutral bidders N.












































Figure 5: Discount, % of EV
Probability distribution of auction discount for N = 20 and N = 150.


































N =  20
N = 150
16When it auctioned o its other telecommunications company, Telecom, just a few months later, the auction drew more
than 270,000 applications from local investors.
Amihud et al. (2003) found large ﬂuctuations in the number of bidders for IPO auctions in Israel. Similarly, Kan-
del et al. (1999) looked at 28 auctions over 3 years in Israel and found that orders ranged from 1,388 to 13,51838. Lin
et al. (2003) and Hsu and Shiu (2004) report wide ﬂuctuations in bidder numbers for Taiwan’s IPO auctions. There is
also evidence of variation in the demand for Singapore auctions39. Subscription levels ranged from the Vickers Ballas
auction, which was 1,300% oversubscribed (at the minimum bid), to Sunright, which was 82% undersubscribed. The
number of bids ranged from 1,128 for Eng Wah to 162,492 for Singapore Telecom. In the same month that Singapore
Telecom’s auction was heavily oversubscribed,the auction of another well-respected Asian telecommunications com-
pany, Korea Telecom, was 90% undersubscribed (i.e. received orders for only 10% of the available shares). While
some of these variations in participation levels would have been anticipated, there would have been some surprises.
We illustrate the eect of structural risk by considering an environment similar to the baseline model, but with
added uncertainty about the number of bidders. For simplicity assume that all bidders are identical and there are L
potential bidders, out of whom either N1 or N2 get to participate, with ex ante probabilities p and 1   p.
Figure 6: Discount and PrfN2 = 150g











































Figure 6 gives the expected discount when the probability of N1 = 150 varies from 0 to 1 for dierent values of risk
38Multiple orders were allowed, so the number of orders might overestimate the number of bidders.
39Data available on request
17aversionofbidders. Theexpecteddiscountissmallwhenthereisnouncertaintyaboutthenumberofbidders. However
when the bidders face additional risk from underestimating the competition (i.e., there is a positive probability of
N = 150,) the expected discount increases. It is highest when the uncertainty about the number of bidders is high, and
the risk aversion of the bidders is also high. Restricting the number of participants to 20 bidders in this case would
result in an outcome clearly superior for the issuer – even though it means abandoning openness, which is lauded as
one of beneﬁts of auctions.
It is necessary to note that there are ways of designing auctions in order to control this risk: for example, requiring
bidders to indicate their intention to bid before starting an auction, with a subsequent revelation of the number of
participants prior to bidding, would reduce both the risk the bidders would face and the return they would demand.
However, such practices so far have not been common in auctions of IPOs40.
Auctions are not the only IPO method for which there have been ﬂuctuations in the number of participants, of
course. However, thetimingofsealedbidauctionsandtheirmethodfordeterminingtheoerpricemakeunanticipated
variations in subscription levels more problematic than for the other two main IPO methods. With ﬁxed price public
oers, the subscription level aects a person’s chance of getting shares but not her return, conditional on getting
shares, since the subscription level does not aect the oer price. With book building, the underwriter observes the
subscription level as well as the ‘bids’ and can then set the price, taking the subscription level into account.
Thus we have shown that uncertainty over the number of bidders leads to more underpricing, more risk and
less accurate pricing. Uncertainty over the precision of bidders’ information leads to similar results (available upon
request).
4.3. Undesirable Equilibria
It is recognized in the literature that auctions have multiple equilibria, some of them undesirable from the stand-
point of the issuer. For example, Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) discuss how “tacit collusion” can have a detri-
mental eect on the issuer revenue in an IPO auction.
Milgrom (1981) considers a modiﬁed setup where information is costly, and after receiving their signals, but
before bidding, agents learn exactly how many of them paid for their information41. He notes that there is a unique
pure strategy symmetric equilibrium, where N bidders choose to participate, with N such that their expected proﬁt
just covers the signal cost – so that participating in an auction with N +1 participants would yield an expected loss. In
this setting no other investor would want to join the auction, and no participating investor would want to deviate from
their strategy.
For example, consider our baseline model of a small IPO with an ex ante expected value of $15MM, with bidders
competing for 15 equal round lots of 100;000 shares each. Additionally, suppose that a participating institution would
have to incur a cost of $9;600 to acquire the private signal, or about 1% of the average lot value42. The bold solid line
inFigure7showsexanteexpectedproﬁttoaparticipantinthisauction, netofinformationcosts, dependingonnumber
of bidders. As we can see, this auction is proﬁtable as long as the number of participants does not exceed 25, which
would be the number of bidders in the symmetric equilibrium of Milgrom (1981), and with 25 bidders the issue is
priced on average with an approximately 1% discount that serves to compensate bidders for the information collection
costs. Naturally, the lower information costs are, the more bidders participate and the better is price discovery (i.e.,
variance of the return to buying in the auction.)
Now let us again consider a departure from this model – however this time, instead of looking at the eects of
uncertainty about the number of bidders, consider what happens when there is uncertainty about their strategies.
Let us see what happens if, starting from this equilibrium, 5 of the 25 bidders unexpectedly participate with non-
competitive (i.e. arbitrarily large) bids. The thin solid line in Figure 7 shows the large decline in proﬁt of other bidders,
which is now negative for most of the range of N. Such a deviation is, of course, not proﬁtable by itself. The presence
of such bidders may seem beneﬁcial to the issuer: as shown by the bottom (dashed) line in Figure 9, they drive up
40The Google, Netsuite, and Rackspace IPO auctions in the U.S. required bidders to acquire unique bidder IDs before the auction began, but the
total number of unique IDs awarded was not announced.
41Sherman (2005) presents a more general model in which information is costly, there are many potential bidders, and each bidder decides
independently whether to evaluate and whether to bid without knowing the choices of others. She shows that endogenous entry adds risk for all
even when all bidders are acting optimally. We show that deviations from the optimal strategy add even more risk.
42This corresponds, for example, to two weeks of labor of a $250;000 a year analyst
18the price for everyone. However this is of course not an equilibrium situation: when other bidders anticipate this
happening, they shave their bids accordingly43: as we can see from Figure 8, they can actually guarantee themselves
proﬁts similar to those of the “no-deviation” case; and the extra revenue the deviating bidder gets comes from the
issuer’s pocket. In Figure 10 this extra discount is given by the distance between the the two lines, and we can see that
it does not decline as the number of “informed” bidders increases, since it comes from rewarding the free-riders.
Note that with unanticipated free riders the auction price can be substantially higher than fair value, i.e., the
auction discount can be a large negative value (see Figure 9.) In contrast, when bidders rationally anticipate that a
certain number of bidders will free ride, the auction price is at a discount to fair value – but the discount is not that
much higher than what would prevail when there is free riding (with 5 free riders), as can be seen from Figure 10.
4.4. Bidding in Auctions can be Dicult
Computing optimal bidding strategies in auctions is not easy, especially when there is added uncertainty about the
bidding environment itself. We illustrate this with an example somewhat resembling a popular TV game “Let’s Make
a Deal”44:
Consider an auction where all the bidders follow the strategy such that the winning bidder will gain $0.5 when
N = 20, and lose $1 when N = 150. Suppose further that the number of participants, N will be 20 or 150 with equal
probability. Hence the expected gain to participating in the auction is 0:5  15
20 = 0:375 when 20 bidders participate.
The expected loss is 1  15
150 = 0:1 when 150 bidders participate. If each bidder considers the two possible outcomes












 $1 = $0:1375












 $1  150 = $   3:75
In other words, while each bidder expects to gain by participating in the auction, collectively they all lose on
average. Obviously something is wrong with the calculations given above. The mistake is that the bidders did not
correctly take into account the fact that whenever he wins it is more likely that there were only 20 bidders and
whenever he loses it is more likely that there were 150 bidders.
In order to correctly calculate the conditional probabilities, it is convenient to assume (without loss of generality)
that N bidders are chosen at random from a larger population N0. Then, from the perspective of a bidder who is
chosen,














PrfN = 150g = 150
170  88%.





150 $1   $0:044, which when multiplied by the ex-ante expected number of participants
of 20+150
2 = 85 gives the total loss as $3:75, the same as the total loss we computed earlier.
This example demonstrates how challenging it can be to correctly calculate the expected returns to participating in
an auction, and thus how individuals may make costly errors that may eventually discourage them from participating
in IPO auctions.
Nonequilibrium models that allow for bidding mistakes have been receiving increasing attention in the literature,
motivated by the need to explain some consistent features of both ﬁeld data and laboratory studies on auctions, such
43Eectively we are looking at an asymmetric equilibrium, where one bidder acts as a price taker and N   1 bidders compete among themselves
for K   1 lots. This leads to a larger proﬁt per winning bidder due to reduced competition. However, these larger proﬁts now have to be shared
among all N participants (including the “free-rider”).
44http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Let's_Make_a_Deal
19Impact of Free-Riding
All environment as before, information gathering cost is at 0.96% of ex-ante expected share lot value, so that 25 investors participate in
equilibrium under free entry (point A). Figure 7 plots bidder proﬁt, net of information acquisition costs, expressed in % of ex-ante expected
share lot value, in the symmetric equilibrium, and in case 5 bidders, unexpectedly to others, forego information acquisition, and make a very
large bid instead. In this case, at the previous break-even point of N = 25, the expected auction discount becomes negative at -5.4% (point
B1), which is equal to the expected loss of each deviating bidder. The other 20 bidders also incur a loss of -3.7% each (point B2), consisting
of the information gathering cost of 0.96%, and the loss of each winner of -5.4%, multiplied by the probability of winning the auction of
(15   5)=(25   5) = 0:5. Figure 8 plots the gross bidder proﬁt. The bold line corresponds to the symmetric equilibrium with no deviation, and
the point A denotes the break-even case of N = 25. The thin solid line shows the gross proﬁt of non-deviating (i.e. information-gathering)
bidders in the asymmetric equilibrium where 5 investors deviate and forego information gathering. In this case, the non-deviating bidders no
longer break even when N = 25, and the new break-even point is at N = 23, where the non-deviating bidders have a gross proﬁt of 1.1%
(point C2) and the deviating ones have a proﬁt of 2.0% (point C1). Figure 9 shows the auction discount under the symmetric equilibrium, and
in case of an unexpected deviation (b). The discount at the break-even point (a) equals to 0:98%  25=15 = 1:6%, exactly compensating the
25 participating bidders for the cost of information. The negative discount of -5.4% at point (b) corresponds to an expected loss of -5.4% by
each deviating and -3.7% by each non-deviating bidder (B1 and B2 in Figure 7 correspondingly). Figure 10 shows the auction discount under
the symmetric equilibrium. At the respective break-even points of N = 25 and N = 23, the discount is equal 1.6% (a), and 2.0% (b). It is
equal to the proﬁt of a deviating bidder (C1 in Figure 8), or to (23 5)=(15 5) = 1:8 times the gross proﬁt of a non-deviating bidder (C2 in Figure 8).
Figure 7: Net Bidder Proﬁt and Unanticipated Free-Riding
O-equilibrium case: 5 bidders “free-ride”, and the others don’t expect
it.

















































































Figure 8: Expected Bidder Proﬁt
Comparison of bidder proﬁts in the asymmetric (“free-riding”)
equilibrium.









































Figure 9: Expected Discount
Auction discount in symmetric equilibrium and unexpected free-riding
(o-equilibrium case.)
































RSE, 5 unexpected deviations
a: 1.6%
b: −5.4%
Figure 10: Free-Riding Equilibrium
Asymmetric equilibrium: the bidders expect a given fraction of bidders
to “free-ride”



























RAE, 5 expected deviations
a: 1.6%
c: 2.0%
20as persistent winner’s curse in second price auctions and overbidding in ﬁrst price auctions. Crawford and Iriberri
(2007) investigate such issues in the context of a nonequilibrium model of strategic thinking, where dierent groups
of bidders maintain dierent beliefs about their environment and the sophistication of their rivals, and show that their
model indeed explains the practically observed phenomena that are dicult to reconcile with rational bidding.
4.5. Summary
In this section, we ﬁrst modeled auctions in a frictionless environment in which all eligible bidders are endowed
with valuable private signals and bid in every auction. In this case auctions are underpriced on average, but not by
much when bidders are risk neutral and there are suciently large numbers of bidders. Risk aversion on the part of
bidders increases the average underpricing, but auction discounts are still relatively low. This is the oft-cited auction
solution in which more bidders leads to a more ecient result, with underpricing largely vanishing once sucient
numbers of investors bid. Hence, in a frictionless world with no information generation costs, auctions lead to highly
ecient pricing as long as they are open to large numbers of informed, sophisticated bidders.
We next examined some more realistic settings, beginning with one in which there is uncertainty over the number
of bidders. Bidding becomes dicult when there is uncertainty about the number of bidders, how much they know and
what strategies they will follow, leading to more risk, more underpricing and less ecient price discovery. We show
that free riders (those who chose to bid very high to be ﬁrst in line, without investing in information collection) add
risk for other bidders and for the issuer, with the issuer ultimately having to underprice more because of the presence
of potential free riders. That suggests a role for monitoring bidders and limiting their access to reduce the free riding
problem.
Last, we showed that it is not easy to bid in auctions, and even sophisticated bidders can make mistakes. When
investors make bidding errors, or when they follow suboptimal strategies such as return-chasing, costs are imposed
not only on those bidders themselves but on all auction participants and ultimately on issuers. The bidding errors and
problems that we have shown in this section appear to match the problems that have occurred in practice in many
auctions around the world, as we will explore in more detail in the next section.
5. Empirical Evidence
In this section we ﬁrst provide some anecdotal evidence supporting the arguments in the earlier section. We
then examine the evidence from Singapore in greater detail. Finally we discuss the US experience with auctions for
Treasury securities.
5.1. Anecdotal Evidence on Initial Returns
It is necessary to note that auctions often lead to very large ﬁrst day gains or losses, which casts doubt upon the
popular idea that auctions should necessarily act as a good aggregator of market sentiment and result in accurate
pricing (assuming that the ﬁrst day market price is a good estimate of the “true” value itself). Appendix C.1 lists
examples of IPO auctions that have led to large ﬁrst day gains, while Appendix C.2 gives examples of negative ﬁrst
day returns. One example is the 1993 auction of Japan Railway East, which was in such strong demand that it was
heavily oversubscribed and yet traded as high as 70% above the auction clearing price on its ﬁrst day. In contrast,
the later auction of Japan Railway West attracted only about one-ﬁfth as many bidders and was 20% undersubscribed.
When El Al, the Israeli Airline, was auctioned o in 2003, demand was so unexpectedly low that orders barely covered
the minimum number of shares. Within days, the stock was trading for more than double the auction price (a 112%
increase) on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Thus, there are many examples of extreme initial returns resulting from
IPO auctions. These do not prove that auctions are inferior to other issue methods, since other methods have also led
to large positive or negative initial returns. Nevertheless, these examples show that the pricing accuracy of the sealed
bid IPO auction method should not be taken for granted. Regarding the question of whether auctions lead to less
underpricing, relative to bookbuilding, the overall evidence is surprisingly weak, since there is little data that allows a
direct comparison. The relevant comparisons that have been made to date are the following:
 France: Auctions co-existed with a restricted, sub-optimal form of book building (a sequential hybrid, rather
than ‘open pricing’ which is a simultaneous hybrid) until 1999, when more standard bookbuilding was allowed
21and auctions were quickly abandoned. Derrien and Womack (2003) found that the dierences in underpricing
between auctions and bookbuilding were “small and statistically insigniﬁcant when examined unconditionally”
(page 47), but that auctions were better than the sequential hybrid bookbuilds in their “ability to incorporate
more information from recent market conditions into the IPO price” (abstract), thus conﬁrming that the dier-
ences were due to the regulatory restrictions on bookbuilding that were later eliminated.
 Japan: Auctions were required for many years but vanished quickly in 1997, once bookbuilding was allowed.
Thus, the two methods did not overlap but were used in close succession. Kutsuna and Smith (2004) found
a small but statistically signiﬁcant increase in initial returns under book building, and also found that a wider
range of companies, including younger start-ups, were able to go public under book building.
 India: Regulations were changed in 2005 to prohibit bookbuilding, replacing it with auctions. Bubna and
Prabhala (2009) ﬁnd that auctions led to more underpricing, relative to bookbuildng.
The evidence is inconclusive, since auctions have led to less underpricing in Japan, more underpricing in India
and to no statistically signiﬁcant dierence in France, relative to bookbuilding.
5.2. IPO Auctions in Singapore
The available data on auctions is sparse and not easily amenable to rigorous quantitative analysis using statistical
methods, since most countries that have tried IPO auctions gave up on them after a few years, leading to small samples.
For example, the inﬂuential Kandel, Sarig and Wohl (1999) paper is based on only 28 IPO auctions in Israel, while
Degeorge, Derrien and Womack (2007) examine only 19 auctions in the U.S. Moreover, data on participation levels
are often unavailable.
Singapore’s IPO auctions during 1993-1994 present an interesting natural experiment and an illustration of some
of the potential issues that we believe is of general relevance. We have data on the full sample of all 20 uniform price
IPO auctions in Singapore, and will attempt a quantitative characterization of that data in this section.
The lessons from the Singapore experience are relevant for several reasons. First, Singapore is a sophisticated
ﬁnancial center whose banking and security markets are well regulated. One example of its technological sophistica-
tion is the fact that IPO auction bidders beginning in 1993 could place their bids through automated teller machines
(ATMs), thus making those auctions as widely accessible as online internet auctions are today. The Singapore stock
market in 1993 was fairly well developed and active, with two active exchanges, 241 public companies traded, and
280MM S$ of average daily dollar transaction volume45.
Singapore’s uniform price auctions were hybrids and thus were well suited to reduce the impact of free riders,
since uninformed investors could also participate, without specifying a price, through the simultaneous ﬁxed price
tranche. Therefore, if there is evidence of free riders including return chasers becoming an issue in hybrid uniform
price auctions, they are likely to be even more of an issue in ‘pure’ uniform price auctions.
5.2.1. The Data
We use data on all 20 Singapore IPO issues that were held during 1993-1994, which include 20 uniform price
hybrid auctions (tenders) and 31 pure ﬁxed price issues46 . The available statistics include size of individual tranches
(ﬁxed price, tender, employee, and private placement), number of shares outstanding and oered, IPO clearing price,
interval data on bids collected (number of bids and number of shares bid in a given price range), obtained from the
Stock Exchange of Singapore.
In addition we use market performance data from Bloomberg Finance L.P., and an archive of Singapore English-
language ﬁnancial press available through Lexis-Nexis Academic.
The main shortcoming of our data is its fairly low duration – there were only 20 IPO’s conducted in Singapore
during those two years, and the method has never been tried there again.
For each of auctions t = 1::T we know:
 Jt bid intervals [bjt;bjt], bJtt = +1
45Daily average exchange rate in 1993 US$1 = S$1.57
46A list of these is available upon request, along with a detailed description of the regulations.
22 qjt: the total number of shares applied for in [bjt;bjt]
 njt: the total number of applications in [bjt;bjt]
 mt: Clearing price
Figure 11 illustrates the bid distribution in the 20 auctions. Each circle represents the low point bjt of a range for
a group of bids in a particular auction; circle size is proportional to the relative size of that group within the auction.
Fixed price is normalized to 1 for all auctions. “x” denotes the price after 1 year. Auction clearing price m is on the
horizontal axis. Blue solid line is a “45-degree” line bj;t = mt and denotes locations of the marginal winning bids.
Figure 11: Bidding in Singapore IPO’s
Each circle represents the low point of a range for a group of bids in a particular auction; circle size is proportional to the relative size of that group
within the auction. Fixed price is normalized to 1 for all auctions. “x” denotes the price after 1 year. Auction clearing price on the horizontal axis.
A “45-degree line” denoting locations of the marginal winning bids in blue. “High” and “Low” expected demand auctions are ranked according
with demand forecasted using the speciﬁcation in (6).
5.2.2. Singapore IPO’s: a Short History
The hybrid auction scheme was ﬁrst introduced as an option for Singapore on July 29, 1991, when companies
were allowed to oer part of the issue in a “Dutch” (discriminatory) auction. It, however, has not gained much
popularity, with only one Dutch tender IPO (Singapore Computer Systems) in 1991, and one more (Keppel Integrated
Engineering) in 199247. No other IPO auctions took place in Singapore until February 1993, when an alternative
uniform price (“French”) auction system was introduced.
47See Hameed and Lim (1998)
23Figure 12: Singapore IPO Issues: Size, Time, and Annual Returns
Top panel: 1-year market adjusted return vs. subscription closing date. Color: subscription rate (ratio of shares applied to shares oered). Colored
circle proportional to value of the tender tranche. Gray area proportional to ﬁxed price tranche. Thin solid circle proportional to market value (all
evaluated at the ﬁxed tranche price). Thin dotted line shows aftermarket movement from ﬁrst day close.
Bottom panel: Thick green line: 90-day cumulative return on the STI index. Thin red line: 90-day cumulative return on a buy-and-hold portfolio
of last 4 tender IPO shares, purchased at tender price (equally weighted)



























































































































































24Figure 13: One month buy-and-hold returns and subscription levels in Singapore
All 1993-1994 auctions are ordered by date. One month raw returns are the returns to winning bidders that held their shares for 30 days in the
aftermarket. The 4-IPO moving average is the average return on the last 4 oers (or all previous, if less than 4). The oversubscription rate is in
percent – an oering that was 60% oversubscribed received orders for 1.6 times the shares available.
A timeline showing Singapore IPO auctions’ size, 1-year returns and subscription levels in 1993-1994 is shown in
Figure 12 and Table 4.
Figure 13 provides visual evidence of how Singapore’s auctions evolved over time by plotting one month returns
and subscription levels for all of Singapore’s auctions, ordered chronologically. Although there were variations, the
returns and participation levels for IPO auctions fell over time. Investors would have made money on ﬁve of the ﬁrst
seven uniform price auctions (known as tenders) in Singapore, if they had bought at the auction strike price and sold
after the shares had traded for one month. The average raw return on the ﬁrst seven oerings was 11.7%, for this
holding period, and the average oversubscription ratio was 4.2 (420% oversubscribed). However, the returns were
negative for seven of the last eight auctions done in Singapore, with an average one-month return of -5.1% for these
auctions (tenders)48. People noticed the poor performance, complaining that auctioned IPO shares were falling below
their auction strike price on the aftermarket and joking that they must be catching a new disease called “tenderitis”49.
While the oversubscription level for the last eight auctions was 0.7, which means that oerings were still on
average 70% oversubscribed, this was substantially lower than the average of 420% oversubscription for the ﬁrst 7
auctions. Two of the last ﬁve auctions were undersubscribed, including the last auction, for Sunright, which received
bids for only 18% of the shares available. The average number of bidders per auction was 48,095 for the ﬁrst seven
auctions50 and 6,494 for the last eight. The decrease in returns is similar if we calculate the one month returns
relative to the Straits Times Index (blue chips) or Sesdaq Index (smaller, younger companies), or if we use two month
48A similar pattern occurred for the 19 U.S. IPO auctions that have been lead-managed by WR Hambrecht from 1999-2007 analyzed in Degeorge
et al. (Forthcoming). For the ﬁrst 9 IPOs, from 1999-2003, the mean initial return is 29.1% with a standard deviation of 84.3%. Excluding
Andover.net, which is arguably an outlier, the mean and standard deviation are 1.3% and 11.5%. For the next 10 IPO auctions from 2004-2007,
the mean initial return is -0.1% with a standard deviation of 5.3%. This less attractive performance, from the standpoint of investors, in the second
half of the sample may at least partially explain why there have been no OpenIPOs since May, 2007. However, there have since been two other
U.S. IPO auctions lead-managed by other investment banks - Netsuite in December, 2007 with an initial return of 36.5% and Rackspace in August,
2008 with an initial return of -19.9%.
49“New strategies needed for future IPOs”, Ven Sreenivasan, Singapore Straits Times, p. 13, February 3, 1995.
50The average is 23,196 for the ﬁrst six auctions, excluding the unusually large Singapore Telecom oering.
25Table 4: Singapore Tender IPO Issues: Subscription and Returns
Subscription rate is deﬁned as a ratio of the number of shares applied for in a tender issue to the number of shares available as of the closing date
of the subscription period. The raw returns are total returns to a bidder who purchased a share at the auction clearing price and sold at the close of
the corresponding period. Adjusted returns are deﬁned as the dierence between raw and market returns (as measured by the Straits Times Index)
in the corresponding period. All market returns are adjusted for dividends.
Company Date Subscription Rate Return
Fixed Price Tender 1 day 1 week 1 month 1 year
Raw Adj. Raw Adj. Raw Adj. Raw Adj.
IPC Corporation 04/26/93 3.9 1.2 22.5% 18.0% 18.1% 12.5% 27.5% 24.2% 81.3% 51.2%
Spore Tech Industrial Corp. 05/24/93 3.9 8.6 4.2% 5.1% -2.5% -0.2% -5.8% -2.2% 56.7% 36.1%
Keppel Bank 06/17/93 16.1 6.0 -5.7% -5.8% -8.6% -6.9% -1.1% -4.8% 19.4% 0.4%
International Factors 07/15/93 29.2 7.2 -4.8% -7.1% -2.4% -8.7% 12.7% -0.9% 15.1% -11.6%
Rotary Engineering 07/28/93 8.1 1.2 2.8% -4.2% 2.8% -6.4% 25.0% 11.4% 32.4% 6.0%
Hwa Tat Lee Holdings 09/23/93 41.0 7.2 19.6% 15.1% 12.7% 6.5% 14.7% 9.9% 6.9% -5.6%
Singapore Telecom 10/28/93 3.0 5.1 15.0% 14.5% 6.1% 10.8% 8.9% 9.6% -10.6% -14.0%
Vickers Ballas 12/16/93 30.9 14.0 -6.0% -10.1% -8.7% -14.4% -19.3% -20.3% -32.6% -21.6%
Pan United Corporation 12/20/93 16.5 5.8 4.0% -2.4% -5.0% -11.1% -12.0% -14.2% -49.0% -37.6%
Hup Seng Huat 02/02/94 32.7 5.6 1.0% 2.8% 0.0% -1.7% -7.5% -0.1% -43.0% -27.0%
Datapulse Technology 02/15/94 34.0 2.3 15.0% 14.9% 10.0% 12.5% 2.0% 14.6% -56.5% -41.6%
Aztech Systems 02/21/94 13.6 1.9 17.4% 19.5% 15.7% 20.5% -2.5% 10.4% -19.4% -3.7%
Nippecraft 04/05/94 11.2 1.4 2.7% -2.9% -2.7% -9.5% -10.0% -17.2% -36.4% -29.2%
Berger International 04/18/94 19.6 1.4 4.7% 2.8% -5.3% -4.4% -7.6% -8.7% 4.7% 16.0%
Comfort Group 06/02/94 24.4 3.3 -4.5% -5.1% -5.4% -4.6% -8.1% -6.4% -1.8% 5.2%
Liang Huat Aluminium 06/15/94 8.5 0.6 4.4% 6.6% 3.5% 6.3% 8.8% 8.7% -1.8% 6.4%
Eng Wah Organization 07/20/94 4.4 1.8 0.8% -0.7% -5.3% -7.1% -3.0% -6.9% -23.5% -16.9%
Superbowl 09/12/94 2.3 2.0 -3.3% -4.1% -6.6% -7.4% -4.4% -7.2% -6.6% 2.6%
Pokka 09/26/94 8.1 3.0 -0.7% -2.1% -8.5% -9.5% -8.5% -8.5% -7.7% 1.0%
Sunright 10/18/94 1.2 0.2 2.0% 2.0% -3.3% -3.4% -8.0% -1.7% 36.0% 48.3%
Total
Average 15.6 4.0 4.6% 2.8% 0.2% -1.3% 0.1% -0.5% -1.8% -1.8%
Standard Deviation 12.4 3.4 8.7% 9.1% 8.3% 9.6% 12.4% 11.5% 35.4% 25.6%
% Negative - - 30.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0% 65.0% 65.0% 60.0% 50.0%
Min 1.2 0.2 -6.0% -10.1% -8.7% -14.4% -19.3% -20.3% -56.5% -41.6%
Max 41.0 14.0 22.5% 19.5% 18.1% 20.5% 27.5% 24.2% 81.3% 51.2%
26returns. It would appear that for investors who were learning and updating their priors over time, auctions became
less attractive.
We argued in Section 4.2 that a large number of unanticipated bids will result in the auction clearing price being
too high, whereas a surprisingly low subscription rate will lead to large underpricing. We further observed that
unanticipated free riders, including return-chasers, may make auctions less attractive for sophisticated investors. We
examine the data in three steps to see whether there is support for these conjectures.
5.2.3. Evidence of Return-Chasing Behavior
Here we investigate what factors aect popularity of a particular IPO auction and whether there is evidence of
return-chasing behavior.
First, we check whether high returns to participating in the preceding auction leads to a higher participation rate
in the current auction, using the following regression (Equation 4):
S Ai = 0 + 1S Fi + 2ri;lag30d + ui (4)
where:
 S Ai is the subscription rate in the ith auction;
 S Fi is the subscription rate in the ﬁxed price tranche, included here to control for unobserved issue-speciﬁc
factors aecting the demand for shares;
 ri;lag30d is the return that would have been obtained by buying in the (i 2)nd auction and selling one month after
trading begins.
Since in Singapore the auction and ﬁxed price tranches occurred simultaneously (as opposed to countries like
Taiwan where tranches took place sequentially,) ﬁxed price tranche demand is a good proxy of overall demand at the
time of the auction.
For the return from a previous auction, ri;lag30d, we use the return from 2 auctions ago because the one month
return on the (i   1)st auction is in general not available by the time the ith auction is open for bidding51. We also
consider the following variation (Equation 5) of equation (4) above:
NAi = 0 + 1NFi + 2ri;lag30d + ui (5)
where:
 NAi is the number of persons bidding in the ith auction divided by the dollar value of shares oered in the
auction tranche, at the reservation price;
 NFi is the number of persons bidding in the ith auction’s ﬁxed price tranche divided by the dollar value of shares
oered in the ﬁxed price tranche.
The results are shown in Table 5, and seem to indicate the presence of “return-chasers”. The coecients for both
variables have the predicted sign and are signiﬁcant at the 1% level. The auction subscription rate and number of
bidders are signiﬁcantly positively related to our proxy for overall demand, as expected. And, after controlling for
demand, the subscription rate or number of bidders is signiﬁcantly positively related to the return on the second-to-last
auction, which is a sign of return-chasing. The R2 is 60% for Equation 4 and 39% for Equation 5.
Thus, both higher underlying demand and a higher return to participating in a recent auction lead to higher partic-
ipation in the current auction.
It is also of interest how much of the variation in demand could be explained by the factors that were observable
by the participants in real time, i.e. before the subscription date. Therefore in the following speciﬁcation we replace
51In two cases we had to use the 30 day return on the (i   3)’rd auction since the return on the (i   2)’nd auction was not available when the i’th
auction opened.
27Table 5: Determinants of Auction Subscription in Singapore
The dependent variable is the auction subscription rate (ratio of the total number of shares requested in all bids to the number of shares oered) for
Equation 4 and the number of bidders in the auction for Equations 5 and 6. The subscription rate or number of bidders in the ﬁxed price tranche are
used to control for overall demand for the shares. Other controls: 90-day cumulative return on a buy-and-hold portfolio of last 4 tender IPO shares,
purchased at tender price (equally weighted), and an increased news coverage dummy (see Section 5.2.3 for details).
Eq. 4 Eq. 5 Eq. 6
Subscr. rate in ﬁxed tranche 0.18
(4.27)
Number bidding in ﬁxed tranche 0.03
(3.29)
1 month ret. on next-to-last auction 14.18 -.001
(3.5) (2.26)
90-day ret. of 4-auc. portfolio 11.05
(4.14)
Increased news coverage 2.72
(2.28)
Constant 0.74 -0.00 3.18
(0.85) (0.77) (5.06)
R2 0.60 0.39 0.56
Obs. 18 18 18
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
the unobservable (to auction participants) characteristics of the simultaneous ﬁxed price tranche with a news coverage
variable52 (Equation 6):
NAi = 0 + 1NEWS i + 2r
p
i;lag90d + ui (6)
where:
 NEWS i is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the current IPO receives more news coverage53 than the median of
all the past auctions, and 0 otherwise
 r
p
i;lag90d is the cumulative 90-day return on an equally weighted buy-and-hold portfolio of shares oered in the
past 4 auctions, purchased at the tender price54, on the last business day prior to the day of subscription
It is easy to see that these real-time variables explain somewhat over half of the variation in participation (R2 =
56%), again suggesting that return-chasing was taking place. Again, the coecient on recent auction return is positive
and signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
While a higher participation rate in the auction is positively related to a higher auction clearing price, the higher
price may be “rational”, reﬂecting a higher intrinsic value of the issue over and above that reﬂected in the ﬁxed price
(and over and above the higher value reﬂected in ﬁxed price tranche demand) – for example, Sherman (2005) models
sealed bid auctions in which informed bidders are following the optimal entry and bid-shaving strategy. This model
predicts that when the intrinsic value of the oering is higher, both the auction clearing price and the initial return to
winning bidders will be higher. It is therefore important to further investigate whether noise bidders adversely aected
the environment.
5.2.4. Bid Distribution and Future Returns
One reason for a high clearing price is naturally a high realization of the share value. Another possible reason for
such results may be the presence of free-riders: bidders who do not engage in price discovery but instead name a very
52See Liu, Sherman and Zhang (2009) for analysis of the role of media coverage in IPOs.
53Measured by the number of articles that mention the IPO in Singapore business press in the 4 weeks before the subscription date
54Green line in Figure 12
28high price in order to obtain an allocation. In an asymmetric equilibrium with such free-riders (whether anticipated
or unanticipated) the distribution of bids will be mixed: the free-riders would bid high regardless of the underlying
value, and the other bidders would bid according to their signals.
Cornelli et al. (2006) note that “in the case of IPOs, Ritter and Welch (2002) conjecture that overenthusiasm
among retail investors may explain high ﬁrst-day returns and low long-run returns. However, the extent to which the
presence of irrational investors (motivated by “investor sentiment”) can account for these phenomena is controversial,
not least because of the diculty in empirically identifying the demand curves of dierent investor groups”. This
diculty presents a problem for us as well, since due to the multiple censoring of our dataset it is not possible for
us to directly observe individual bids. However in what follows we present several quantitative results that seem to
conﬁrm irrational investors’ presence.
The number of bid ranges in our bid data and their breakpoints are auction-speciﬁc and do not allow for direct
comparison between auctions. However, in presence of free-riders there should be aggregate eects: namely, their
presence should increase the variance of the bid distribution and create positive skewness.
On the other hand, a high mean bid can be a signal of either high underlying value, or free-rider presence, or both.
Therefore, controlling for the mean, we would expect free-riders to drive up auction prices relative to the underlying
value, and potentially cause future negative returns. In line with prior reasoning, we would also expect free-riders to
be more prevalent among smaller individual bidders55.
We use a two-step estimation procedure: ﬁrst, we approximate the bid distribution in each auction by a separate
lognormal distribution. This distribution choice allows us to capture changes both in the mean (potentially attributed
to higher underlying value and overall, rational or irrational, level of excitement about the issue ) and in the skewness
and variance (which both positively depend on the same parameter ). In addition, these parameters, unlike range
statistics, can be compared across auctions.
We use maximum likelihood to estimate the bid distribution parameters:







where the observed values Jt;bjt;njt are as described in Section 5.2.1.
Figure 14 shows the estimated  and  for the applications distribution in the 18 auctions for which we have
sucient data56. As one can see, most losses characterize auctions with either a high , or a high , or both, which is
a picture that one would observe in presence of a large number of bidders who do not engage in price discovery.
Table 6, Panel A illustrates the relationship between the parameters of the applications distribution and future
returns. Given the small sample size, a robust version of the estimation is presented in Table 6, Panel B, showing
similar results. We can see from these tables that either a high , or a high , or both, are signiﬁcantly negatively
related to one year returns on the oerings, as one would expect if the auction price and initial demand are inﬂuenced
by a large number of bidders who do not engage in price discovery.
One last piece of evidence of the presence of free riders in our data is the analysis of the very highest bids. If
a bid is so high that it seems implausible as a genuine result of careful analysis, the more likely explanation is free
riding, and thus we look for excessively high bids in our data. In four of our twenty auctions, the highest bids were
more than 1,000% of the reservation price. The highest bid was 1,153% (817%) of the reservation price (clearing
price) for STIC, 1,200% (1,182%) for Eng Wah, 1,700% (1,000%) for Hwa Tat Lee Holdings and 5,000% (2,778%)
for Singapore Telecom. In the case of Singapore Telecom, the reservation price of $2.00 translated to a prospective
price-earnings (PE) multiple of 27 times. The highest bid was 50 times this, implying a PE of 1,350 times for a mature
company in an established industry. This is clear evidence of the presence of at least some free riders, while our earlier
analysis indicates that there were sucient numbers of such investors to aect the auction price.
55For IPO auctions in Taiwan, Chiang et al. (2009a) ﬁnd that institutional investors are informed and bidding optimally, but that retail investors
are return-chasing and following suboptimal bidding strategies. Chiang et al. (2009b) ﬁnd further evidence that retail (but not institutional) investors
in Taiwan’s IPO auctions suer from nave reinforcement learning, while Degeorge et al. (Forthcoming) ﬁnd evidence of free riding and possible
return-chasing by retail investors in U.S. IPO auctions.
56Since two auctions were undersubscribed, we are not able to estimate the bid distribution shape there. However we note that both of these
auctions produced positive returns (48.3% in case of Sunright and 6.4% for LiangHuat Aluminum), and their undersubscription implies either a
low , or low , or both, so we consider our results to be conservative
29Figure 14: Applications Distribution and IPO Returns
Returns are market-adjusted (using STIC index); 1 year from tender. Circle area proportional to absolute return; red ﬁlled circles represent losses;
blue crossed circles represent gains.

















































































Table 6: Applications Distribution and IPO Returns
Regressions of gross returns to investors who get in and out of a position at dierent points in time on estimated parameters of the distribution of
bids in the IPO auction. Returns are between the points listed, which are (FIX: ﬁxed price tranche, AUC: auction clearing price, 1D: ﬁrst trading
day close, 1Y: last close in the ﬁrst year of trading), market-adjusted where relevant: e.g. (FIX, AUC) is the auction premium, and (1D,1Y) is the
market-adjusted return from the ﬁrst day to the ﬁrst year close.  and  are the estimated parameters of the ﬁtted lognormal distribution. Panel A
shows results from a regular least squares regression (robust variance estimates are used). Panel B reports coecients from robust regressions that
reduce the impact of outliers (see Hamilton (1992) for a detailed description).
(FIX, AUC) (FIX, 1D) (FIX, 1Y) (AUC,1D) (AUC,1Y) (1D,1Y)
Panel A: Least Squares Estimates
ˆ N -0.536 -0.270 -3.289** 0.171 -2.179** -2.285**
(-0.76) (-0.25) (-2.60) (0.32) (-2.62) (-2.86)
ˆ N 1.269*** 1.237*** 0.385* -0.0129 -0.486** -0.451**
(14.85) (7.93) (1.77) (-0.10) (-2.48) (-2.65)
Constant 0.0145 0.0136 0.715** 0.000676 0.509** 0.495***
(0.13) (0.08) (2.67) (0.01) (2.80) (3.27)
R2 0.866 0.721 0.298 0.006 0.502 0.571
Obs. 18 18 18 18 18 18
Panel B: Robust Estimates
ˆ N -0.478 -0.129 -3.077* 0.123 -2.088** -2.244**
(-0.72) (-0.12) (-2.08) (0.16) (-2.19) (-2.32)
ˆ N 1.271*** 1.226*** 0.435 -0.00493 -0.385* -0.438*
(8.51) (5.17) (1.31) (-0.03) (-1.80) (-2.03)
Constant 0.00306 -0.00910 0.639** -0.00856 0.433** 0.480**
(0.03) (-0.05) (2.51) (-0.07) (2.65) (2.90)
R2 0.841 0.670 0.237 0.002 0.458 0.501
Obs. 18 18 18 18 18 18
t statistics in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
305.3. Lessons from Treasury Auctions
The auction method is old and well established, and has been particularly successful for the largest security issue
markets – those for government debt, particularly US Treasury securities. Auctions have been frequently used for new
preferred stock issues in the United Kingdom, particularly for government-owned utilities57. Key dierences between
government debt and IPOs make auctions theoretically more likely to work for these high grade debt auctions. First,
Treasury auctions are held frequently at regular time intervals, with a core of regular participants. Fleming (2007)
shows that, for 903 US Treasury security auctions between July 30, 2001 and December 28, 2005, 75.4% of the
securities were purchased by dealers and brokers. Although there are more than 800 ﬁnancial institutions set up to bid
directly in Treasury auctions, they accounted for only 0.5% of the allocations, with individuals accounting for another
0.5%. Thus, Treasury auctions have a stable set of regular bidders – the 22 primary dealers that are expected to
participate regularly. Moreover, close substitutes to the extremely high grade debt securities being issued are already
trading actively in the market (on the when issued market, through the o the run securities, etc.), making valuation
relatively easy and precise.
In spite of these advantages it took several decades for auctions to replace the ﬁxed price method for selling
Treasury bonds, even after auctions had been adopted for US Treasury bills. Garbade (2004) provides a detailed
analysis of this process, noting in particular how back in 1959 the Secretary of the Treasury Robert Anderson in
his testimony before the Joint Economic Committee defended the ﬁxed price method, stating that “many of the small
banks, corporations, andindividuals... didnothavetheprofessionalcapacitytobidinanauction. Lackingprofessional
expertise, they were liable to either bid too high and pay too much or bid too low and be shut out, and therefore were
likely to avoid note and bond auctions altogether”. Garbade (2004) further demonstrates that these worries were quite
well-founded, given that the US Treasury failed in its ﬁrst two attempts, in 1935 and 1963, to establish auctions for
long term bond sales. The third attempt, in the early 1970s, succeeded due to the Treasury’s combined “familiarity,
gradualism, and willingness to improvise”.
Fleming and Garbade (2002, Table 2) show that even now, of the four main securities lending facilities in the
US and UK, two of the four use ﬁxed price oerings rather than auctions. One reason for this can be that bidding
is dicult even for today’s sophisticated institutional investors. For example, Fleming and Garbade (2007) oer
evidence that dealers frequently fail to shave their bids suciently in certain types of US Treasury auctions, passing
up “true arbitrage opportunities” in these auctions. Fleming et al. (2005) show that they also fail to exploit certain
simple mechanical proﬁt opportunities58. On the other hand, Goldreich (2007) shows that both discriminatory and
uniform price Treasury auctions lead to underpricing. Thus, even in cases when some of the easiest-to-value securities
are sold to a regular set of sophisticated investors, there is evidence that the auction method has not always been
preferred over ﬁxed price methods, and that these regular bidders sometimes lack the sophistication to place optimal
bids. In contrast, IPOs occur less frequently, at sporadic intervals, and their value is much more dicult to determine.
Each issue is dierent and may attract a dierent set of participants, many of whom have little relevant experience.
Thus, the apparent relative success of contemporary auctions for government debt does not guarantee that the auction
method will also be preferred for IPOs.
As we can see, even in Treasury auctions, it took a while to make things work. The key feature is the stable
number of sophisticated bidders, coupled with a noncompetitive tranche to accomodate unsophisticated bidders.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁrst established a surprising empirical regularity - that IPO auctions have been tried in at least 25
countries, and have generally been rejected in favor of other methods for bringing new equity issues to the market. IPO
auctions have been used for issues of all sizes, from very small to very large. The auction methods used have varied,
yet the outcomes have been surprisingly consistent: When issuers have been given a choice, they have generally
chosen not to use auctions once they became familiar with the method. In this sense, IPO auctions have consistently
failed the market test.
57In the six month period from Oct. 1, 1974 to March 31, 1975, all seven preferred stock issues in the UK used ”Oers for Sale by Tender”, i.e.
auctions. The issuers were all local waterworks or water companies.
58Due to the speciﬁc price rounding scheme used in Treasury bill auctions, some bids oer strictly inferior expected proﬁts; however many
participants still bid at those suboptimal levels
31We did not ﬁnd support for the common explanations oered for the unpopularity of IPO auctions in the US - that
issuers were reluctant to use a new, experimental method, or that underwriters pressured issuers to use a method for
which they charged higher fees or were able to allocate underpriced shares. We did not ﬁnd that issuers consistently
preferred the method that led to the lowest initial returns. Moreover, there is little support for the popular view that
auctions lead to highly accurate pricing and hence to a low mean and variance of initial returns.
In order to explain these regularities, we examine the issue of complexity. While indirect mechanisms, such as
auctions, may have simple rules, this does not imply that the investors’ task is in any way simple: for example,
bidders must place their bids before knowing how many others will enter the auction, and those who invest time and
money evaluating an oering risk being squeezed out by others who do not adequately understand the optimal bidding
strategies and perhaps have no information on the value of the shares.
The optimal bid for any one participant depends on the number of other bidders, their information sets and their
bidding strategies, but none of this is known at the time that bids are placed in a sealed bid auction – presenting a
structural risk, which can easily exceed the uncertainty about valuation of the company itself. In other words, optimal
auction bidding strategies are complicated, requiring sophistication and discipline, and mistakes by some impose costs
on all bidders. Without some way to screen out “free riders” and ensure the participation of sophisticated, long term
investors, IPO auctions are highly risky for both issuers and bidders.
Bookbuilding, on the other hand, is closer to a “direct” mechanism and therefore requires less bidder sophistica-
tion. With book building the underwriter can act as a gatekeeper, coordinating the number and type of entrants, and
setting the price and allocations only after observing all orders. In a realistic example, we solve for an optimal direct
mechanism with multiple investors, and show that it is in fact characterized by many features that are associated with
bookbuilding in real life.
At the same time, bookbuilding gives enormous discretion to the mechanism administrator (i.e. underwriter),
whereas auctions are transparent with little discretion. Bookbuilding is thus vulnerable to abuse by underwriters, at
the expense of issuers. Jagannathan and Sherman (2005) propose ways to make bookbuilding more transparent and
thus, eectively, closer to auctions in that sense. The optimal placement method is likely to be dierent from both
traditional book builds, with their lack of transparency and resulting opportunities for potential abuse, and standard
sealed bid auctions, with their high risk for both investors and issuers.
Standard sealed bid auctions have rigid, automatic pricing and allocation rules that do not appear to satisfy the
many goals that issuers have for IPOs, based on the market test. However this does not mean that optimal auctions
– or more generally, transparent placement methods – cannot be designed. Thus, we proposed a direct-revelation ex
post incentive compatible optimal uniform price mechanism, demonstrating roles for both informed and uninformed
investors to play, and then we compared its properties to those that have been observed in actual issues. We also
demonstrated how such a mechanism can be used to ensure sucient information collection in case of costly signals,
comparing revenues and other properties with those of a hybrid auction.
Although the outcomes in various countries have been surprisingly consistent in terms of which issue methods
have been chosen by issuers, it is important to oer a menu of alternatives to issuers, since the best method may
depend on conditions and may change over time. For example, uniform price auctions may be a better method in
exuberant times, when accurate evaluation is dicult and thus not the main driver of pricing, such as with dot.coms
during the internet bubble. At the time, no one knew how to value the stocks. The use of uniform price auctions
would have allowed the oer prices to be driven up until the shares were overpriced by most estimations, leading
to aftermarket price drops that would have popped the bubble earlier. Since each issue method has advantages and
neither clearly dominates, only the market can tell whether there is a place for both or only one of them. We should
have competing mechanisms available to issuers.
In summary, there have been many experiments with IPO auctions across dierent countries, cultures and market
conditions over the last several decades. The auction method has failed the market test, in the sense that issuers have
eventually rejected the method in virtually all countries in which issuers were allowed to choose among alternatives.
We oered an explanation for this, based on the complexity of optimal bidding strategies and the vulnerability of each
bidder to mistakes by others. We modeled this explanation and proposed an alternative direct mechanism for IPOs,
comparing its properties with those of a hybrid auction.
32Appendix A. Auctions vs. Bookbuilding
In this Appendix we show that uniform price auctions can do what book building can do in terms of price discovery
and underpricing when the cost of gathering information is suciently large, and there is a binding minimum amount
that must be allotted to uninformed investors. For this purpose, we examine two uniform price59 IPO placement
mechanisms in a stylized economy. One is an optimal direct allocation mechanism, somewhat resembling book
building in its’ setup and the resulting outcomes (hereafter referred to as book building for convenience), and the other
is a hybrid auction. Both methods provide for allocation of shares to competing sophisticated informed investors as
well as uninformed and possibly unsophisticated investors. Participation by uninformed investors may be desirable
for a variety of reasons, including the need for wide spread holding of the issue.
One major dierence between the two mechanisms is that the former, being direct, employs a relatively complex
allocation rule on the part of the underwriter, but it is optimal for all investors to truthfully report own valuations.
In contrast, the auction oers a relatively simple allocation rule for the underwrite to follow with no discretion, by
moving the complex computational burden to all sophisticated informed investors participating in the auction.
Design of optimal IPO mechanisms has received wide attention in the literature. For example, Maksimovic and
Pichler (2006) examine the problem of allocating an IPO between informed and uninformed investors under a discrete
information structure. Spatt and Srivastava (1991) ﬁnd that the optimal mechanism for IPOs incorporates both pre-
play communication and participation restrictions. Malakhov (2007) presents an optimal uniform price mechanism
for the case where all informed agents act in perfect collusion (in eect there is only one informed bidder). In that
case, an analytical closed form solution exists and is characterized by substantial underpricing that results from the
monopoly power of the informed investors, while the presence of rational uninformed investors helps reduce the
bargaining power of the informed. The problem with multiple bidders is substantially more complex60. Here we
investigate a direct-revelation ex-post incentive compatible optimal uniform price mechanism, as well as a hybrid
auction mechanism, in a setting resembling that of Malakhov (2007), but allowing for competition among multiple
informed investors.
We ﬁnd that the book building method results in less underpricing on average when compared to the hybrid auction
method for a given number of informed investors participating in the IPO. However, in the example we consider, when
there are no rents to being informed under the book building method, and the minimum allocation to the uninformed
is binding, the allocations and the underpricing under the book building method are about the same as those under the
auction method. That suggests that under certain conditions the auction method can achieve what book building can.
Hence the inability of the auction method to compete with book building and ﬁxed price methods may in part be due
to the fact that auctions are indirect methods requiring high degree of sophistication on the part of all participants,
which may be dicult to satisfy in practice.
Appendix A.1. Economic Environment and Calibration
Consider an underwriter who has to issue Q shares. The underwriter has access to N informed institutional
investors each of whom receive a private signal about the true value of the issue by incurring a ﬁxed cost of C, and a
pool of  uninformed retail investors. Let us denote the joint probability density function of the signals as g(s). Let
fsijV denote the probability density of signal si received by investor i conditional on the true value of the stocks being








where V is the true value that is distributed according to GV on 
V  R, and s = (s1; s2;:::; sN) 2 
  RN is the vector
of signals.
59We focus on uniform price auctions for two reasons. First, regulations in many countries (e.g. Rules of Fair Practice of the National Association
of Securities Dealers in the US) prohibit price discrimination. Second, if uniform price auctions can achieve what book building can achieve under
some conditions, more complex auctions may be able to as well as book building under more general conditions.
60Bennouri and Falconieri (2004) investigate a case with multiple informed agents, but under a special simpliﬁed information structure that
makes it dicult to draw parallels with auction models
33ˆ V(s) is the expected value of V conditional on the entire vector of signals:








We assume that all distribution functions and their parameters are public knowledge, and all parties have correct
priors. Let ui(s) denote the ex post realized utility of agent i conditional on the vector of signals being s, when prices
and allocations are given by pi(s); xi(s);i = 1;2:::N. For risk-neutral investors, ui(s) = (ˆ V(s)   pi(s))xi(s). Since most
countries impose the restriction that that all those who receive an allocation in an IPO issue should pay the same price
, we will focus on the uniform-price case where pi(s)  p(s) 8i.
We assume that in any type of issue, at least 50% of the shares have to be allocated to a pool of  uninformed
bidders for exogenous reasons.
In what follows we consider a hypothetical IPO of 1;500;000 shares. The value of each share is lognormally
distributed with an expected value of V = $10 (i.e., total value of $15million), and standard deviation of log(V) = 0:30.
Each private signal si;i = 1;2;:::N is lognormally distributed with an expected value that equals the realized value
of the share, and a standard deviation of log(si) = 0:30. We will consider the case where the bidder pool consists of
N = 2 investors each of whom can become informed by spending the ﬁxed cost C and  = 50 uninformed bidders. In
the examples, unless otherwise stated, we will assume that the information gathering cost is $225,000 per informed
investor – i.e., 3% of the expected value of the 750,000 shares that are not reserved for uninformed investors.
We will now consider two methods for issuing the Q = 1,500,000 shares. In the ﬁrst method – which we will
call book building for convenience – the two informed investors collect the signals by paying C, and truthfully reveal
them to the underwriter. The underwriter keeps aside 50% (i.e., 750,000 shares) as the minimum amount to be
allocated to the uninformed investors. The underwriter then decides on the price p(s) and nonnegative allocations
xi(s);i = 1;2, subject to the condition that (x1(s) + x2(s) < 750;000). The uninformed are allocated a total of
750;000 + (750;000   (x1(s) + x2(s)) at the same price p(s). Let QI and QU denote the expected number of shares
allocated to the informed and the uninformed investors, with QI + QU = 1;500;000.
In the second method, the underwriter ﬁrst oers a single block of QI shares to the two informed investors using a
uniform price auction. Each of the two informed investors pay the information cost C and collect their signals. After
observing their own signals they submit their bids bi(si);i = 1;2. The entire block of QI shares are then allocated
to the highest bidder at the price, p(s) that equals the second highest bid. The uninformed investors are allocated
QU = 1;500;000   QI shares at the same price p(s).
Appendix A.2. An Optimal Direct Mechanism (Book building)












for any i;i = 1;::N (it is the same for all i), subject to the following implementability constraints (in the derivations
below we assume that there are N informed investors, even though we set N = 2 in our computations.) Here, we shall
consider only mechanisms that treat the agents in a symmetric way, i.e. allocations xi and promised utilities ui do
not explicitly depend on i, and any change in order of elements of the vector argument s would only result in an
equivalent change in order of elements of x and u (note that due to conditional independence functions g and ˆ V are
always symmetric in this way).







;8i , j (A.4)
(A.5)
34‘Ex-post Incentive Compatibility’ Constraint: We want each informed bidder i to have the incentive to reveal her
signal truthfully conditional on the realization of the entire vector of signals s = (s1; s2;:::; sN) – i.e. she would not
want to report a dierent signal even after learning what signals were reported by the other bidders.






(s)xi(s) 8i 2 1;2;:::;N (A.6)
Proof. Letussupposethattheinvestors1;2;:::;i 1;i+1;:::;N receiveavectorofsignals s i = (s1; s2;:::; si 1; si+1;:::; sN.
Suppose the investor i receives signal si and reports s0
i to the underwriter. His utility is then given by ui(s i; si; s0
i) =
(ˆ V(s i; si)   p(s i; s0
i))xi(s0
i). Suppressing the ﬁrst argument s i for clarity, truth-telling requires that 8si; s0
i,
ui(si; si)  ui(si; s0






i)  ˆ V(si)x(s0
i)   ui(si; si). Therefore,
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i; s0
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i)   ui(si; si)  (ˆ V(s0
i)   ˆ V(si))x(s0
i)
On the other hand, truth-telling also implies that ui(s0
i; s0
i)  ui(s0
i; si), similarly implying that
ui(s0
i; s0
i)   ui(si; si)  (ˆ V(s0
i)   ˆ V(si))x(si)
and therefore we have
(ˆ V(s0
i)   ˆ V(si))x(si)  ui(s0
i; s0
i)   ui(si; si)  (ˆ V(s0
i)   ˆ V(si))x(s0
i)
Dividing by s0
i   si and taking the limit s0
i ! si, we obtain (A.6).
Ex-post incentive compatible mechanisms have many desirable properties, in particular they are less sensitive to
the investors’ opinions about beliefs of other investors61. This formulation is similar to that of the modiﬁed Vickrey
auctions of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) where each bidder can submit a schedule of bids contingent on the realiza-
tions of the bids of others. “Open-book” issues where buyers can see others’ orders and modify theirs accordingly
can be described as having some of these properties, although there is a timing issue in practice, since most bids are
usually placed near the end of the auction period. The road show process can also lead to some information about the
bids being revealed over time. In this situation, agents ﬁnd it optimal to follow their equilibrium strategies regardless
of the exact distribution of others’ types (Chung and Ely, 2007).
‘The allocation to an individual uninformed bidder does not exceed that of the informed’ Constraint: We






‘Incentive to gather information’ constrant: The informed bidders do not have an incentive to forego infor-
mation gathering and instead participate in the issue as uninformed (implying that their ex-ante expected gain from
61A mechanism that is very sensitive to such hard-to-measure parameters as bidders’ opinions about opinions of others is much more prone
to be undermined by their mistakes and disagreements: as Wilson (1987) noted, “Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the
consequences of trading rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deﬁcient to the extent it assumes other features to be common
knowledge, such as one player’s probability assessment about another’s preferences or information”.




[ui(s)   uu(s)]g(s)ds  C (A.8)








‘Total allocation to the informed does not exceed Q=2’ Constraint:
X
i
xi(s)  Q=2 (A.9)
Appendix A.2.1. Solution Properties
As we will see, the book building mechanism in this model economy has properties that match several empirical
regularities documented in the literature. Figure A.1 shows the fraction of the 750,000 shares oered through book
building(withtheother0.75millionallocatedtotheuninformedatthepricesetthroughthebookbuildingprocess)that
is given to the uninformed investors who participate in the book building process as a function of the signals received
by the two informed participants. They receive a relatively larger fraction of shares when the informed bidders agree
with each other, but this share falls as the reported signals and the implied expected value of V increases. Figure
A.2 shows the expected auction discount given values of the signals received by the two informed participants – it is
highest when there is little disagreement about the issue price and the allocation to the uninformed bidders is low.
These properties are consistent with the empirical regularity that large investors with an established relationship
with an underwriter (informed investors in the model) tend to receive more shares when they are more valuable, and
when the issue is more heavily underpriced (see, for example, Jenkinson and Jones (2004, 2008) and Cornelli and
Goldreich (2001, 2003); Cornelli et al. (2006).)
Figure A.3 gives the percentage of the shares oered through book building that is allocated to the ﬁrst informed
participant as a function of her signal when the signal received by the second informed participant is ﬁxed (at s2 =
14:5.) As can be seen, when the cost of gathering information is low, the second participant gets some allocation
even when the ﬁrst participant gets a higher signal. However, as the cost of information gathering increases (and
consequently the required compensation for information gathering increases,) the fraction allocated to the participant
with the lower signal value declines. In the limit, as the information gathering cost reaches the maximum information
gathering cost that can be supported (rewarded) through book building, almost all the shares are given to the informed
participant receiving the higher signal, and the allocation scheme approaches that of the uniform price auction (i.e. a
step function centered at the other bidder’s reported signal). This suggests that when the auction outcome is such that
there are no rents to gathering information, the minimum number of shares to be given to the uninformed becomes
binding, and book building can not improve much on the outcome of the auction – the auction clearing price and the
auction allocations will be close to the solution under the book building mechanism.
Figure A.4 illustrates the ex post incentive compatibility property of the book building mechanism: regardless of
the realization of bidder 2’s signal S 2, bidder 1 never has an incentive to misreport his own signal S 1.
Figures A.5 and A.6 plot the equilibrium proportion of the shares oered through the book building mechanism
that is allocated to the informed participants as a group, as a function of the auction discount and the cost of gathering
information respectively. As can be seen, the fraction allocated to the informed participants increases with the auction
discount and with the cost of gathering information. Note that IPOs that have a higher information gathering costs are
the ones that will on average be associated with higher discounts. Those are the issues that also have a larger fraction
of the allocations going to the informed participants, consistent with the observation in the literature that “hot issues”
are typically allocated more to institutional investors (who are more likely to be informed.)
Figure A.7 illustrates the relationship between disagreement between the signals of the informed bidders (mea-
sured by Bray-Curtis distance
js1 s2j
s1+s2 ) and the auction discount when the cost of gathering information is ﬁxed at 3%
of the expected value of the 750,000 shares oered through book building (i.e., $225,000), one point in the graph
corresponding to one particular realization of signals. As we can see, the discount is higher for the issues where
36disagreement is higher. When both informed investors report the same signal (a group of red points in the lower left
corner), the discount is relatively low. It is still, however, increasing in the issue price, as ﬁgure A.8 illustrates.
Appendix A.3. A Hybrid Auction
Our hybrid auction consists of a ﬁxed price tranche, open to all investors, and an auction tranche, that is only open
to the two informed investors. As discussed earlier, hybrid oering methods are used in most countries. Such hybrids
have the feature that individual investors are allowed to self-select, so that those that do not have relevant pricing
information can participate in the ﬁxed price public oer tranche.
The issue price is determined in the auction tranche, with the highest bidder receiving the entire informed allo-
cation at the price equal to the second highest bid. The size of each tranche in the hybrid auction is pre-announced.
Thus, the primary dierence between the “stylized bookbuilding” and the “hybrid auction” methods is that the former
allows the underwriter extra ﬂexibility to change how much to give each bidder depending on the signals that are
communicated.
Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) examine an economy where some agents are endowed with information about
the value of the IPO issue. They show that the optimal mechanism resembles book building, but that an auction
like mechanism can come close to book building. Sherman (2005) considers an economy where anyone can choose
to become informed by incurring a cost, and shows that a book building like mechanism will in general dominate
the uniform price auction for IPOs. Here, we consider an environment with a richer signal space, nesting both the
endowed and costly information cases, and show that a hybrid auction may lead to the same solution as the book
building like mechanism when information gathering costs are suciently high.
Again, suppose the issuer is selling Q shares, with an uncertain value V each. He has access to a pool of 2
institutional and  individual bidders, and selects their respective total allocations, QI and QU, prior to the auction
(such that QI +QU = Q). He then collects bids from the informed bidders, allocates QI shares to the highest informed
bidder at the price equal to the second highest bid, and splits the remaining QU shares between the uninformed bidders
at the same price.
Each participating informed bidder i 2 f1;2g can obtain a signal si at a cost of C each, where we again assume
that si are independent and identically distributed, conditional on the realization of V. All bidders and the issuer
understand the information structure and have correct priors about all the distributions.
As before, the underwriter is able to distinguish those who gathered information from those who didn’t, and
prevent the uninformed bidders from pretending to be informed. However, as the “ﬁxed price” tranche is open to
everyone, he is not able to prevent potentially informed bidders from participating in the issue as uninformed (or from
not participating at all), and needs to provide sucient incentives for them to accept his invitations, implying the
participation constraint
Ef(V   p)QIg 
1

Ef(V   p)Qug +C (A.10)
In the comparison that follows, we will compare book building outcomes to matching auction outcomes that have
the same fraction of shares allocated to the informed investors QI.
Appendix A.4. Book building vs. Hybrid Auctions: a Comparison
Each line of Table A.1 presents a comparison of a book building mechanism that guarantees the informed in-
vestors a particular level of compensation for information gathering with a hybrid auction that provides the same total
allocation to the informed, and gives the rest of the issue to the uninformed.
The left panel of Table A.1 shows the eect of an increase in the information gathering cost C for book building:
when it is low, it has no eect on prices and allocations since the lowest attainable discount of 5.71% provides
enough revenue to cover up to $130,000 in information gathering costs; however as information gathering costs
rise above $130,000, the underwriter is forced to discount shares more deeply. At the same time, he is also allocating
progressivelyfewersharestotheuninformed. Itisnotpossibleinthissettingtoprovideadiscounthigherthan10.46%,
or, equivalently, to compensate a cost of gathering information higher than $370,000. Note that when information cost
37Allocations and discounts in Book building (Optimal Direct Mechanism) of Section Appendix A.1. The value V per share is distributed
lognormally with E(V) equal to 10 and standard deviation of 0:30 for log(V) – corresponding to a standard deviation of 30% for the continuously
compounded rate of return to an uninformed investor in the stock. The private signal S is centered at the actual share value, conditional on which
it is also lognormal with a standard deviation of 30%. The bidder pool consists of 2 potentially informed and 50 uninformed bidders. The cost of
information for each bidder in Figures A.1 and A.2 is ﬁxed at 3% of expected issue value.
Figure A.3 illustrages how the optimal incentive-compatible allocation scheme approaches that of an auction as the required compensation for
information gathering increases: each line shows the allocation to Informed Bidder 1 as a function of his reported signal, given that the signal
reported by Bidder 2 is equal to 14:5. Note that the allocation in an auction is a step function, with Bidder 1 getting 100% of the informed
allocation when S1 > S 2, 0% when S 1 < S 2, and 0:5 when S 1   S 2. Figure A.4 illustrates ex-post incentive compatibility: each line shows
expected proﬁt of bidder 1 who received a signal S1 = 0:49 as a function of his report S 0
1, for three dierent levels of S2.
Figure A.1: Signals and xu






























































Figure A.2: Signals and Discount

















































Figure A.3: Informed Allocation
Percentage of Informed Allocation to Bidder 1 when Bidder 2´ s Signal
= $14:5.


























































Figure A.4: Ex-Post IC Constraint
Cost of deviation from truth-telling by Bidder 1.










































































38Allocations and discounts in Book building (Optimal Direct Mechanism) of Section Appendix A.1. The value V per share is distributed
lognormally with E(V) equal to 10 and standard deviation of 0:30 for log(V) – corresponding to a standard deviation of 30% for the continuously
compounded rate of return to an uninformed investor in the stock. The private signal S is centered at the actual share value, conditional on which
it is also lognormal with a standard deviation of 30%. The bidder pool consists of 2 potentially informed and 50 uninformed bidders.
Figure A.5: Discount and Informed Allocation
Equilibrium combined share of the informed bidders in the optimal
mechanism vs. the auction discount



















































Figure A.6: Cost of Information and Discount
Equilibrium share of the informed bidders in the optimal mechanism as a
function of information gathering cost C


















































Cost of Gathering Information ($$ per share of $10 value)
Figure A.7: Disagreement and Discount (C=0.03)



































Figure A.8: Discount under Full Agreement (C=0.03)

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































40varies from one issue to another, that would generate a positive correlation between IPO underpricing and allocation
given to the informed investors (“preferred” clients.)
Note that as the cost of information, and with it the need to compensate the informed investors for that cost,
increase, both the expected discount and the allocation to the informed investors in the book building mechanism also
increase.
On the other hand, the discount in the hybrid auction (right side panel of Table A.1) is determined by the level of
competition between the informed bidders, and for a given number of informed bidders (2 in this example) it stays
the same regardless of their actual allocation – provided that this allocation is actually sucient to compensate them
for information gathering. Thus, the hybrid auction is characterized by multiple revenue-maximizing allocations. The
highest possible compensation for information gathering ($370,000) is attained when all of the 750,000 shares goes
to the informed (note that we reserved 750,000 shares, i.e., half the 1,500,000 shares being issued to be oered to the
uninformed.) In that case the expected discount in the hybrid auction is 10.37%, about the same as the discount that
obtains under the book building method.
As we noted earlier, in the example we examined in this section, allocations and prices under the book building
mechanism come close to that under the uniform price auction as the required compensation for information ap-
proaches the maximum that can be supported. However, there is one critical dierence: in the auction (which is an
indirect method), the computational burden lies with the investors, all of whom have to correctly evaluate the environ-
ment and each other’s bidding strategies. In contrast, “book building” (which is a direct method), takes this burden
from the investors and places it with the more experienced underwriter, thus eliminating the potentially disastrous
consequences of mistakes.
These results suggest that book building may not help improve on the outcome of the hybrid auction method when
the informed just cover their cost of gathering information.
Appendix B. Computation Details
Appendix B.1. Evaluating Auctions
To ﬁnd equilibrium bidding functions in the calibration exercises, we numerically solved equation (2) in the sym-
metric case, and its suitably adjusted modiﬁcations in the other cases. The lognormal signal distribution was approx-
imated with a truncated lognormal on a range [S;S] = e 10;e+10]. Monte-Carlo integration with 100;000 draws
of (V; s i) was used to compute the conditional expectations; in order to properly account for low tail probabilities and
avoid underﬂow we used importance sampling62. In risk-neutral cases such as (3) the optimal bids were computed
directly; in the general case, a two-step procedure was used: in the ﬁrst step, a Monte-Carlo sample was generated;
in the second, an iterative zero-ﬁnding algorithm63 was used to ﬁnd the optimal bidding function conditional on the
sample. We found that the solution is very robust with respect to the Monte-Carlo sample selection.
In order to improve computational performance, integration was used to evaluate the bidding functions on a grid
of values spanning [S;S], with piecewise cubic Hermite polynomials64 used to interpolate the functions between the
grid points.
Given bidding functions computed as above, various outcomes such as expected proﬁts were also computed using
Monte-Carlo simulation with 1,000,000 iterations.
Appendix B.2. General Optimal Mechanism
Due to our assumption that the price and allocations are symmetric in that they do not explicitly depend on i,
but only on signals reported, the dimensionality of the underwriter’s problem can be reduced. Instead of optimizing
over N allocations for each realization of N signals, we note that the the constrained optimization problem given by
equations (A.3-A.9) can be equivalently speciﬁed in terms of minimizing the expected discount   ˆ V(s) p(s) 
ui(s)
xi(s),







62See, for example, Judd (1998).
63See Forsythe et al. (1977)
























(ui(s)   uu(s))g(s)ds  C (B.5)






=. The signal space was then discretized using a square grid of T  T
(T = 25) points and the lognormal bivariate signal distribution was approximated with a truncated lognormal. The
solution to (B.1-B.5) in terms of  and the boundary values uijsi=S was found using a multidimensional constrained
SQP algorithm65. Due to the symmetry of , only
T(T+1)
2 elements of  and T elements of u0 have to be determined.
Appendix C. Details on International IPO Experience
Appendix C.1. High ﬁrst day gains
 TenagaNasional, Malaysia, May1992, 34%: Malaysia’sﬁrstauctionwasahybriddiscriminatoryauction/public
oer. Initial returns for winning bids ranged from 23% to 34%, even though the market-clearing price in the
auction was almost 46% above the 4.50 ringgit reservation price. The initial return for the public oer was 94%.
 DDI (an aliate of Kyocera), Japan, September 1993, 49%: Bids went as high as 6.02 million/share. The oer
price was set at 3.7 million, because most successful bids were concentrated at that price. The ﬁrst day’s close
was at 5.5 million.
 East Japan Railway, Japan, October 1993, 58%: JR East soared 70% above the market-clearing price the ﬁrst
day, only to drop back down to around the 370,000/share oer price within two days. Winning bids ranged
from 352,000 to 623,000, so the highest bidders were still out of the money when the stock closed at 600,000
the ﬁrst day.
 Petron, the Philippines, Sept. 1994, 63%: Hybrid discriminatory auction/public oer. The ﬁrst day’s closing
price was 63% above the lowest winning bid, 23% above even the highest bid, 39% above the highest foreign
bid and 136% above the reservation price. The ﬁxed price tranche drew 459,133 subscribers.
 Andover.net, US, December, 1999, 252.1%: The oering was priced at $18 even though the clearing price was
$24, reportedly to avoid any delay. The ﬁrst day’s closing price was 164% above even the auction clearing
price.
 El Al, Israel, June 2003, 40%: Demand was low in the auction – they sold fewer shares than expected, all priced
at the minimum bid. The shares began trading on the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange just two days later, closing up
40% the ﬁrst day and up a total of 112% by the end of the second trading day.
Appendix C.2. High ﬁrst day losses
 Japan Telecom, September 1994, down 14.5% from the weighted average bid price of 5.44 million/share on
the ﬁrst day, and down another 10% by the end of the week: The lowest successful bid was 5.22 million, but
the public oer price (set after the auction) was 4.7 million, showing that the auction bids were considered
unrealistic. The weighted average bid price gave the company a P/E of 219 times prospective earnings, in a
mature telecom market.
65As implemented in the optimization package SNOPT, see Gill et al. (2002)
42 Japan Tobacco, October 1994, down 23.5% the ﬁrst day, and it kept falling from there: The auction had been
unusually enthusiastic, with a weighted average winning bid of 1.438 million/share for shares that institutional
investors valued at no more than 800,000. Successful bids ranged from 1.362 million to 2.11 million. It closed
the ﬁrst day at 1.10 million, and the second day at 1.06 million (down more than 26%). After 2 weeks of trading,
it was at 956,000, down 33.5%. The highest bidders lost almost 48% the ﬁrst day. 41% of the shares were never
sold.
 Global Securities (Global Menkul Degerler A.S.), Turkey, May 1995, down 11% the ﬁrst hour: The reservation
price was set at TL6,000 per share, but bids went as high as TL100,000. The auction price was set at TL9,750,
a 62.5% premium. The price fell by 56.1% (giving a market-adjusted return of -60.5%) over the ﬁrst three
months.
43Table C.1. International Experience with IPO Methods
Country Argentina Australia Austria Bangladesh Barbados
Main sources: E-mail - COMISIÃ N NACIONAL DE
VALORES (ciprod@mecon.ar) 1/29/99;
^The Economist Intelligence Unit;
~"Black gold" by Katherine Conradt,
LatinFinance 07/01/1993
Euroweek April 1998 Supplement,
Australia: A Special Report; ^Letter -
Australian Stock Exchange, 23 April 1996
Letter - Wiener Borse (Vienna Stock
Exchange), 14 June 1996
Press Release, Chittagong Stock
Exchange, Sept. 14, 2008
Letter - Securities Exchange of Barbados,
8/28/97
Does gov't restrict methods? No No No Yes
Most commonly used method ^Hybrid Book Building Hybrid Book Building Hybrid Book Building Public Offer (only method allowed until
recently)
Public Offer
* Public offer (Fixed price) Have virtually disappeared Yes - Usually for small firms Yes Yes - only method used
      Advance payment? ^Yes No Yes
* Book Building Yes Yes - "the norm" Yes - Traditional for large IPOs, such as
privatizations
     Is it gaining popularity? Already dominant Yes
     When was it first used? ~1993 for Yacimientos Petroliferos
Fiscales
1992
* Tender/Auction ~Tried in 1991-92, then abandoned Tried briefly in 1999 (see below) No Allowed, beginning 2009
     Discriminatory/uniform
Hybrid Methods? Yes, at least for privatizations - Hybrid
Book Building/Public Offer
Yes - "open priced book building
approach" widespread
Yes - book building for larger issues
includes an open pricing public offer
tranche 
Yes - auction with fixed price public offer
General notes: ^According to the Economist Intelligence
Unit, March 9, 2000, listings on the
Buenos Aries Stock Exchange have been
declining for years. ~In 1992, a Dutch
auction was used for the Telecom
privatization, but the overpricing led to a
market crash. So, in 1993 for
Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales, book
building was used for the first time, with
great success.
Two offerings by Ord Minnet's eCapital in
1999 were called bookbuilds but were
online auctions, with updated weighted
average bid prices posted twice a day and
people allowed to change their bids any
time during the auction. The open priced
bookbuilding approach was pioneered in
Australia by the then Potter Warburg in
the 1992 Government Insurance Offices
flotation. "Short form" retail prospectus
first used in Nov. 1998. According to
Asian Business, Sep. 2000, "Enter e-
IPOs", scripless "e-IPO" methods already
in use.
Public offer procedures are different from
listing offer procedures & are governed by
different EU directives. IPOs are possible
without listing. Subscription periods vary
widely - up to seven weeks for smaller
IPOs; 2 - 3 days for internationally
announced, well-publicized offerings,
with a possibility of early closing;
occasionally, privatizations close only
after a few hours. It is possible that the
foreign tranches of some large IPOs have
included auction-type elements
In 2009, Bangladesh began allowing two
stage sequential hybrid offerings where
prices are set through the "true Dutch
auction" method. Only institutional
investors are allowed to bid in the auction.
The subsequent fixed price public offer
opens at least 25 days after the auction
price is determined. This method is
officially called "book building", but the
offer price is automatically set at the
market-clearing price and allocations are
pro-rata.
There were 3 IPOs in 1994, none in 1995
and 2 in 1996. 1994: Barbados Farms
Ltd., ST. James Beach Hotels Ltd. and
CIBC W.I. Holdings Ltd.; 1996: Almond





Does gov't restrict methods?
Most commonly used method
* Public offer (Fixed price)
      Advance payment?
* Book Building
     Is it gaining popularity?
     When was it first used?
* Tender/Auction
     Discriminatory/uniform
Hybrid Methods?
General notes:
Brazil Canada China Chile
E-mail, COMISSÃƒO DE VALORES
MOBILIÃ RIOS, <intl@cvm.gov.br>,
9/20/99; ^www.bndes.gov.br.; ~Letter -
Bolsa Do Rio, 26 Aug. 1996; *Newspaper
articles
E-mail, Commission des valeurs
mobilières du Québec, 10/29/99
Gao (2010); *Newspaper articles E-mail, Superintendencia de Valores y
Seguros, Oct 7, 1999; ^ Santiago Stock
Exchange, 11/14/99; *Celis and
Maturana(1998).
No Yes Yes - Only one method allowed at a time; changed often No (but pension funds can only buy thru
an exchange)
Hybrid Book Building Book Building Public Offer *Hybrid Book Building/Auction on
Exchange
Yes, ~but usually with IB discretion in
allocation
Sometimes, only in combination with bb Used in early 1990s Allowed
Yes;  some term pmts No Yes
Yes - first used in global offers; now also
in domestic offers.
Yes - primary method Yes, but with very unusual features; market still developing Yes
Yes Yes
1992, for global offerings 2005 for local offerings (earlier for foreign portions of international offerings) *1995
Allowed; *sometimes used before 1994 No Yes, from 1999-2002 Yes - on stock exchange
~Both have been used Uniform
Yes - bb with public offer Sometimes - bb with public offer, but no
pay in advance (similar to US bb w/ some
shares sold to retail)
Yes, hybrid bookbuilding/public offer, but with unusual features Yes - bb to determine price & auction on
exchange for pension fund investors
As in many Latin American markets, there
were few domestic IPOs in Brazil for
many years, with delistings outnumbering
new listings. According to the
International Federation of Stock
Exchanges Sept. 2000 Newsletter, there
was only one IPO in 2000 and only 7 or 8
in the last four years. *In 2000, 41
companies were delisted by November 6,
with another 27 expected by year-end.
*The market picked up in 2006, with 26
IPOs that year and more than double that
number in 2007.
Issuers can specify the price in the
preliminary prospectus, making the
method more like Public Offer, but they
rarely do. Best efforts offerings are legal
but also rare.
From 1990-2000, strict quotas limited which companies allowed an IPO. Fixed price
public offers were used for most of the 1990s, with prices set by government
formulas rather than by issuers. The price rule was based on book values from 1990-
1995 and required a P/E of 15 from 1996-1999. Auctions were used from July 1,
1999 to 1st half of 2002, with pricing dominated by individual investors through on-
line bidding. Offer prices pushed to high levels, with many stocks suffering large
losses in later trading. From July 2002 to 2004, the regulator returned to a
controlled P/E system, with offering price P/E ratios less than 20. A type of two-
stage book-building system was adopted on January 1, 2005. IPO price set by
institutional investor feedback, then institutional and individual investors placed
orders. *This method was replaced by another form described as bookbuilding in
summer, 2009. Bookbuilding methods tried so far in China are not comparable to
methods used elsewhere. Regulatory reforms in 1999, 2005 and 2009 all promised to
finally reduce the role of the government in price-setting.
^,*Regulations changed in 1995 to allow
pension funds to buy IPO shares, but only
through an exchange. Thus, road shows
are used to set price and allocate some
shares, while shares to pension funds must
be sold thru either an auction or daily
transactions on the exchange. Almost all
IPOs are best efforts rather than
underwritten. Major tax advantages to
individuals buying primary shares
guarantee them an approximately 10%





Does gov't restrict methods?
Most commonly used method
* Public offer (Fixed price)
      Advance payment?
* Book Building
     Is it gaining popularity?
     When was it first used?
* Tender/Auction
     Discriminatory/uniform
Hybrid Methods?
General notes:
Czech Republic Egypt Finland France Germany
E-mail, the Czech Securities Commission,
10/26/99 ^Prague Stock Exchange
Website, www.pse.cz
Newspaper articles in Financial Times,
Euromoney, International Herald Tribune,
Associated Press Worldstream
E-mail, Financial Supervision Authority of
Finland, 11/29/99; ^Letter - Mandatum &
Co., 30 May 1996; Also see web page
www.rata.bof.fi
E-mail - Listing Division, Paris Bourse
SBF SA, 7/28/2000, ^Derrien and
Womack (1999)
E-mail - BAWe (Bundesaufsichtsamt fur
den Wertpapierhandl) 2/2/2000,
www.bawe.de; ^E-mail - DGBank, 
11/18/99
Yes No Yes, but many options No
^Hybrid Book Building/Public Offer Fixed Price Public Offer Hybrid Book Building/Public Offer Hybrid Book Building/Public Offer Book Building
Yes - "must be used for first round" (for
voucher privatizations)
Yes - primary method Yes  Yes - Offre a Prix Ferme (OPF) or Open
Price Offer (OPO; only for hybrids)
Yes - Offentliches Angebot ^now
superseded by bb
Yes - 30% (installment) Yes Usually, for retail investors No, but need corresponding cash in
account
No
^Yes, since 2004 Yes, at least for some large offers Yes Yes - Placement Garanti (PG), only as
hybrid
Yes - ^"used for almost every IPO"
Yes Yes Yes
1993 1995
possible for second round, if number of
orders is too high or too low in first round
Allowed Rare - Offre a Prix Minimal (OPM) No
"single, but rules of auction can be
different"
Uniform price Uniform price
Possible to have auction/public offer, but
not common
Yes - bb with public offer Yes - bb for institutional, public offer for
retail at price set by bb - "most common
over last 18 months" (to Nov., 1999)
Yes - All book building must be combined
with either OPF or OPO
Yes - "lottery" methods often used for
retail tranche allocations; IB discretion
All Czechoslovakian companies
nationalized in 1948 & owned by the state
from 1948 - 1990. Two waves of voucher
privatizations - in 1993 & 1994. ^
Private co. IPOs on Prague Stock
Exchange began after Czech Republic
entered European Union: Zentiva, 2004;
ECM Real Estate & Pegas Nonwovens,
2006; AAA Auto, 2007; New World
Resources (NWR), 2008, through a large
joint listing in Prague, London and
Warsaw. Prague SE less active than
Warsaw & Budapest Exchanges. Retail
allowed to participate.
The Cairo Stock Exchange was dominated
by privatizations for much of the 1990s
and saw the first truly private company
IPO in 1997, with Cairo Precision
Industries. Fixed price public offer with
pay in advance was the only method until
2000. Orascom, June 2000, was the first
hybrid bookbuild/public offer. After
Orascom, there were no IPOs at all until
the Dec. 2004 IPO of Lecico, which was
also a hybrid bookbuild, as was Egypt
Telecom in Dec. 2005.  
IPOs governed by Securities Market Act
495/1989. Must set preliminary price
range in prospectus. Usually, price for all
shares set by bb, but w/ price ceiling for
retail tranche (or else retail investors must
have at least one day to cancel orders after
price set). Investors in public offer
sometimes get interest on subscription
funds, depending on when subscription
was paid. Price for employees usually
10% lower than for retail, for tax reasons.
Issuer must at least estimate # of shares
for each tranche in prospectus.
Open Price Offer (OPO) introduced in
1999 because sequential hybrid PG/OPF
required setting price too far in advance.
With hybrid PG/OPO, price is not set until
day of listing, *as in hybrid bookbuilds in
most countries. Derrien &
Womack(2003) showed bookbuild
problems due to time delay of PG/OPF.
When simultaneous hybrid bookbuilding
(PG/OPO) allowed, auctions dried up
except for two in 2005: Cafom on Second
Marche in January and MG International
on Alternext in June. Auctions died out
later on unregulated Marche Libre (Free
Market).
"In recent time the book building
technique has been used for nearly all
IPOs, local offers and international
offers." ^"Sometimes retail investors are
preferred for privatizations or larger
transactions. For example, the issuer
offers discounts for orders given early
within the subscription period." ^A joint
statement was made by the larger issuing
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General notes:
Hong Kong Hungary India Indonesia Ireland
General sources; ^Asian Business, Sep.
2000, "Enter e-IPOs"
E-mail, Hungarian Banking & Capital
Market Supervision, 11/30/99
SEBI (Securities & Exchange Board of
India) web page, www.sebi.gov.in;
*Bombay Stock Exchange, 4/13/96;
^Assoc. of Merchant Bankers of India,
5/27/96.
Indonesian Capital Market Supervisory
Agency (BAPEPAM) , 9/24/99; www.
bapepam.go.id; ^"IBRA sets BCA share
price at Rp 1,400", The Jakarta Post,
Thurs. 05/11/2000.
E-mail, Irish Stock Exchange, 9/15/ 99;
*Newspaper articles
No Yes Yes No
Public Offer, but Hybrid Book
Building/Public Offer increasing
Hybrid Book Building/Public Offer Auction; was Public Offer Hybrid Book Building
Yes Yes Yes - *, ^ most common in 1990s Yes - only method allowed before 2000 Used mainly for larger offerings
Yes Yes - minimum 10% installment * Usually; installments common. Yes Yes




Allowed since 1993 but never used Allowed, not used Yes, since 2005 No Very rare.
Uniform price
Yes - bb only with public offer;
simultaneous
Yes - bb/public offer is the most common
method
Yes - originally sequential hybrids, which
led to timing problems; simultaneous
hybrids later allowed
Yes - sequential hybrid, with fixed price
public offer after bookbuild
Yes - bb/placing with public offer.
Simultaneous.
In hybrids, amount initially allocated to
retail investors is typically only 10-15%,
but clawbacks can raise the % to 30-50%
if retail demand high. Often a third,
private placement tranche for “strategic
investors”. Overallotment options
common. Grey market trading begins
during, or even prior to, the offer period.
Substantial interest may be earned on
subscription funds when demand is high.
^Hong Kong's Securities and Futures
Commission has released detailed
guidelines for electronic initial public
offerings (e-IPOs).
Greenshoe options common. Current SHs
may have right of priority. Otherwise,
shares in public offer allocated under "the
principle of card dealing, or subscription-
proportionate allocation". BB used for the
majority of institutional allocations
(private placements). Public offer was
main method in 1990-94. BB used 1st for
large, international transactions. Public
offer in hybrids has a fixed price range or
maximum price, so final price can be set
by bb. Note: Budapest Stock Exchange
(as well as Warsaw) most active in region.
BB allowed but heavily restricted in1995.
Rules relaxed July, 1999, & BB became
more popular. Sept. 19, 2005, the
regulator (SEBI) banned BB in favor of
auctions through SEBI Circular #
SEBI/CFD/DIL/DIP/16/2005/19/9 
changing institutional investor allocations
from “discretionary” to "proportionate".
Since 2005, only hybrid auctions & pure
public offers allowed, but upper limits for
auctions make some effectively fixed price 
also. Auctions may be open book, with
updated bidding totals posted online every
30 minutes during auction.  
All IPOs fully underwritten; may list on
Jakarta or Surabaya Stock Exchange, or
both. Allocation method: Max. 40% to
institutional (pro-rata); rest to retail,
favoring small applications (pooling basis -
everyone gets at least 500 shares and rest
pro-rata; if 500 shares each is not feasible,
use lottery). ^ Indonesia nationalized
many banks that failed as part of the 1998
Asian flu. IBRA (Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency) began hybrid
bookbuilds to sell banks, beginning with
Bank Central Asia (BCA) in 2001
Usual time period from day the offering
price is set to the day the subscription
period begins varies significantly - approx
one month but could be less or more.
*The number of IPOs on the Irish Stock
Exchange has not been high, but generally
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* Public offer (Fixed price)
      Advance payment?
* Book Building
     Is it gaining popularity?
     When was it first used?
* Tender/Auction
     Discriminatory/uniform
Hybrid Methods?
General notes:
Israel Italy Japan Jordan Kenya
E-mails - Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, Feb.,
Sept. and Oct. 1999; *Newspaper articles
E-mail, Borsa Italiana S.p.A. 11/24/99;
^Italian Stock Exchange Commission
(CONSOB) web page, www.consob.it
Pettway (1999); ^Institutional Investor,
June 2000, "Opening Japan's Capital
Markets"; *Newspaper articles
E-mail, Amman Stock Exchange, 24 June,
1997; ^Amman Stock Exchange web
page (accessme.com/AFM). 
Fax, Capital Markets Authority, 4/3/00;
^"Deals of the Year, 2009", The Banker,
May 1, 2009
Not since mid-2007 Yes, but several options Yes
Auctions? Hybrid Book Building/Public Offer Hybrid Book Building Public Offer - only method allowed Public Offer
Yes Yes - only for retail Yes, but w/ allocation discretion Yes
No No Yes Yes
Allowed since mid-2007 Yes - only for institutional Yes ^Used only once so far, for the foreign
tranche of a large offering
Too soon to tell Already the only method used Yes
1997/1998 ^2008, for Safaricom
Yes - required for a decade Not used Yes
Uniform price, but two stages Discriminatory
bb/public offer - only method in last few
years
Yes - auction up to 50% of shares; rest
sold at auction weighted average bid
price. *Hybrids also for bookbuilding. 
Yes - the one bookbuild still used fixed
price public offer for local investors
Two stage auctions - Institutional auction
takes place 24-48 hours before publication
of prospectus. Winning inst'l orders
included in prospectus. Institutional
investors may not withdraw their bids, can
only offer HIGHER prices in public
auction. Public auction 7 days after
prospectus released. * From 1993-2003,
fixed price public offers banned, only
auctions allowed. Some auctions, some
fixed price public offers occurred in 2004-
2007. BB first allowed in mid-2007. Few
IPOs in 2 years since BB allowed, due to
market conditions.
Substantially more funds raised from sale
of existing shares than from new shares
for primary offers in general (this includes
privatizations and seasoned issues); public 
offer tranche usually close to 40%, but the
size of each tranche can be adjusted based
on demand. Maximum price for public
offer set at least 1 day before the open of
the subscription period.
Auctions began 04/01/89 as hybrids: up to
50% sold through auction, rest distributed
at weighted average winning bid price.
Method for remaining shares similar to
placing - price fixed in advance but
underwriter can distribute to anyone (max.
5,000 shares). Book building only
allowed since 1997 fiscal year. Auctions
disappeared within one quarter.
^Commercial Code requires the par value
of a share to be backed by a minimum of
Y50,000 in assets, leading to very high per 
share prices that discourage retail
investors.
^Offering price currently set by Issuing
Committee at Ministry of Industry and
Trade. This will soon change with the
introduction of private sector underwriters
to the market. The subscription period
will be determined in the near future by
the new regulations that regulate the new
issues that will be issued in accordance
with the Companies Law and the
Securities Law that was passed on May
15,1997.
Public Offer method: Investors pay in
advance, wait 3 weeks for refunds.
Interest on float goes to compensation
fund. Price set 10 days before
subscription period opens. Those who
apply for minimum number of shares
usually get them. Allocation is at the
issuer's discretion, but figures on intended
allocation must be furnished to Capital
Market Authority. ^BB tranche was
considered for KenGen in 2006 but too
controversial. Safaricom, 2008, is only
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General notes:
Korea Malaysia Mexico Netherlands New Zealand
E-mail, Korea Securities Research
Institute 10/26/99; ^Korea Stock
Exchange fax, International Relations,
April 13, 1996; *Newspaper articles
E-mail, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange
(now named Bursa Malaysia), 1996;
*Newspaper articles
E-mail, Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (the





OF THE NETHERLANDS), Oct. 1999;
^"KPN's Stock Won't Trade Until
Completion of IPO", Wall Street Journal
Europe, 05/20/1994
E-mail 10/15/99 - Securities and
Exchange Commission of New Zealand;
www.gplegislation.co.nz; ^Fax - Cavill
White Securities Ltd., 21 May 1996
Yes No Yes
Hybrid Book Building Hybrid Book Building Public Offer Hybrid Book Building Hybrid Book Building
Yes, in hybrids; Was only method until
1998
Yes -  traditional method Yes becoming obsolete Yes - but brokers have allocational
discretion.
^Yes Yes No Yes; installments getting popular. Legal
min. = 10%.  
Yes - most common *Yes - hybrid ^Yes, at least for international tranches Yes Yes
Yes *Yes - it has become the main method Yes Yes - last few years
Required beg.1998 for KSE, 1999 for
KOSDAQ
"In recent years" 1997
Only if co. not listing on an exchange Used for several large privatizations;
hybrid
Allowed "Not applicable in practice"
Discriminatory Uniform price
Yes, at least for privatizations Yes - both hybrid auctions and hybrid
bookbuilds; simultaneous
Yes - bb with public offer Yes - bb with public offer Yes - bb for institutional, public offer for
retail at price set by bb
There have been several dozen internet
Direct Public Offerings (DPOs), some of
which used auctions. Book building is
required if the co. wants to list on KSE or
KOSDAQ. *Korea until recently required
Public Offer, and the gov't set the offer
price until 1996. Recent Korea Gas Co.
privatization used public offer for retail,
max. order 4,000 shares, and bb for
institutional, with price set by bb.
Some issuers must provide profit
guarantee (through bank guarantee) of at
least 90% of forecast earnings for first 2-3
years. Early 1990s: often long lines for
subscription forms. Mid-1990s: began
publishing forms in newspapers. 30% of
IPO shares allocated to bumiputras (until
2009). Securities Commission still
reserves right to review price setting.
Before 1/1/1996, the SC set price fairly
low, leading to high returns and low
application success rates (i.e. heavy
rationing) for IPOs. *Recent trend (2009)
is to attract foreign, particularly Chinese,
firms to list in on KLSE.
IPO "has to be opened to all investors"
(except foreigners, who face industry-
based limits). ^Stock exchange officials
considered lowering listing requirements
in 2000, to encourage listings.
Regulations loosened in 2007, because
listings on the BMV had fallen from 200 a
decade earlier to only 133, with only 4
IPOs in 2007. Many IPOs were cancelled
in 2008, and no companies had even
begun the process in the first half of 2009.
Given the overall inactivity of the IPO
market, we cannot tell if bookbuilding is
likely to become popular.
Book building is "almost standard practice
nowadays". The involvement of retail
investors in IPOs is high. AEX is
currently studying rules concerning the
distribution of shares. One of the
proposed new rules is the duty to disclose
the allotment of the offered securities. ^At
least in 1994 and before, book building
had to be completed and the final price set
before the opening of the public offer
subscription period. Almost all issuers
allowed grey market ("when issued")
trading prior to completion of their IPO.
Public Offer method required by
Securities Act 1983, but many exceptions
have been made. The Securities
Commission is allowed to grant
exemptions & has used this power on
several occasions since 1997 to permit
open pricing, including book building.
Book building used mainly for
institutional tranche of international
offerings but also for strictly local
offerings. For Public Offer, brokers have
discretion in terms of allocation; "public
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General notes:
Norway Pakistan Paraguay Peru Portugal
E-mail - Banking, Insurance and
Securities Commission of Norway, Sep.
99; ^Letter - Oslo Bors (Oslo Stock
Exchange), 14 June 1996
E-mail, Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan, 12/01/99; ^web
page - Karachi Stock Exchange (Listing
regulations), updated 30-05-1993; *Media
search
E-mail - Comision Nacional de Valores,
Oct 99; the Stock Exchange web page is
www.pla.net.py/bvpasa
E-mail - Lima Stock Exchange, 10/20/99 E-mail, Comissão do Mercado de Valores
Mobiliários (www.cmvm.pt), 11/11/99;
*Newspaper articles.
No Yes No No Used to, but since relaxed
Hybrid Book Building Public Offer - only allowed method Public Offer (only method used so far) Hybrid Book Building Public Offer, often as a hybrid with Book
Building
Yes, but rare except for retail tranche of
hybrid
Yes Yes Yes - the most common
No, not usually Yes No Sometimes, but not usually Yes
Yes -mainly for institutional.  No Allowed, not used Yes Yes, hybrid with public offer tranche
Yes Yes, particularly for institutional inv. Yes
increasingly popular over last few years. ^June '95 Portugal Telecom privatization
Yes, but "rarely used" Only for privatizations to one buyer Allowed, not used Yes "Very rare" now, but used in past
Uniform price Uniform price
Yes - bb for institutional and public offer
for local retail with price set by bb.
No No Yes, particularly for privatizations - Book
Building/Public Offer
Yes - bb for institutional, public offer for
retail
No changes in regulations in last 10 years.
^The main reason for the Public Offer
tranche is that companies need a certain #
of shareholders, holding shares of at least
NOK 5 to 10 thousand, to list on the Oslo
Stock Exchange. Small investors
sometimes get their shares at a discount,
and occasionally they are favored in the
allocation process.
Offer price was set by the government up
to June 30, 1995. ^May refund unused
subscription funds through direct depost
rather than mailing check. No company
listed unless public offer subscribed by at
least 250 applications. Prospectus
published at least 7 but no more than 30
days before subscription period begins;
share certificates sent to successful orders
within 30 days of subscription close.
Only fifty companies quote in the only
Stock Exchange, the Bolsa de Valores y
Productos de Asuncion S.A. (BVPASA),
most having opened their capital only
partially. Most shares were placed among
existing shareholders in virtue of the right
of preferential option. The first stock
negotiations in Paraguay took place in
October 1993 (market less than 10 years
old). 
Book building used mainly for
international transactions but sometimes
for local issues. Most Peruvian
companies are closed "family" companies.
Therefore raising capital is seldom done
through an IPO. Primary Public Offering
Regulation, modified on October 12, 1998
considers that primary offers should be
carried out through an exchange floor, to
provide issues with a more transparent
and regulated framework as well as to
attract local and foreign investors.
Bookbuilding first used for instutional
tranches of privatizations, but became
popular for private company IPOs as well.
Auctions popular for IPOs in the 1980s
but 'very rare' in the 1990s. *No private
Portugese company chose an auction after
1988, but the government still used
auctions for privatizations until the
insurance company Mundial Confianca's
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General notes:
Singapore South Africa Spain Sri Lanka Sweden
E-mail - Stock Exchange of Singapore,
10/11/99; also the SES web page
(www.ses.com.sg)
Web page and e-mail - Johannesburg
Stock Exchange, 10/99; www.jse.co.za
*Newspaper articles
E-mails, Bolsa de Bilbao 11/16/99;
*COMISIÃ N NACIONAL DEL
MERCADO DE VALORES 9/23/99,
10/18/99; ^Euromoney, Apr.'99, p.99-102
Letter - Colombo Stock Exchange, 26
May, 1997
E-mail, OM Stockholm Exchange,
7/25/2000; ^Letter - Finansinspektionen
(the Financial Supervisory Authority),
12/18/1996
Yes Yes *No No No
Hybrid Book Building Hybrid Placing (similar to Book Building) Hybrid Book Building Public Offer Hybrid Book Building
Yes -traditional Yes, but not popular except as part of
hybrid
Yes - retail tranche Yes - only commonly used method Yes
Yes; sometimes a fixed fee instead Yes No; deposits sometimes required Yes Yes, usually "a couple of days" before
delivery
Yes Placing - similar to bb in allocations but
price set in advance
Yes - institutional & sometimes 100% Allowed, not widely used Yes, for institutional tranche
Yes Yes  Yes
1st - 1995, 2nd - 1999; Officially allowed
since March 2000 Allowed; not used since 1994. No *Allowed, "not habitually used" Allowed, not widely used Not used
Uniform price
Yes - simultaneous hybrids for both
auctions and bookbuilds
Yes - placing and public offer. Yes - bb/public offer Yes - bb/public offer
First 2 auctions, in '91, '92, were
discriminatory. Fund managers disliked
them, suggested single price, which was
used from '93 on. 12 of 21 IPOs in '93 and
11 of 33 in '94 were auctions. No
auctions since. One bb in '95, 2nd in
1999, a possible third one on the way.
Rest of the 20 IPOs in '95, 21in '96, 37 in
'97, 21 in '98, 30 thru Sept. '99 all public
offer. Electronic Share Application (ESA)
and electronic balloting since 1993. 96%
of applications thru ESA in 1996, 99%
since.  
For placing, 30% of the shares must be
offered to the sponsoring broker, who
must allocate a reasonable number to
other brokers (usually 30% of his
allocation). They arrange for private
clients or institutions to take up parcels of
shares, subject to a fee, to ensure
sufficient spread of shareholders. A third
method, introduction, is allowed for
companies that want to be listed but do
not need to raise capital. *Telkom
privatization, 2003, was first use of
simultaneous (rather than sequential)
hybrid, i.e., first open pricing.
More and more public offer orders are
becoming binding even before final price
is set. Sometimes discounts are offered
for orders placed before a certain date.
Shifting shares between retail &
institutional tranches based on demand
must be foreseen in prospectus. ^Most
offerings have retail tranches that tend to
be heavily oversubscribed; private issues
sometimes don't bother to include
international institutional investors,
because local demand is strong.  
Hybrids allow open pricing. However, "as
a protective measure for the retail
investor, a maximum price must be set in
advance. The maximum price is normally
set above the indicative price range."
Privatizations are rare but are usually
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General notes:
Switzerland Taiwan Thailand Turkey United Kingdom
E-mail - - Switzerland Stock Exchange,
11/24/99; ^Letter - Zurcher Borse (Zurich
Stock Exchange), 4 June 1996
E-mail Chinese Securities Association,
11/2/99; ^Chiang, Qian and Sherman
(2009)
Letter - Securities and Exchange
Commission, 14 May 1996; ^Asiamoney,
Nov. 2000, "Ratchaburi brings back sweet
Thai memories"
E-mail - Istanbul Stock Exchange
(intercrd@imkb.gov.tr), March 1999; Fax,
Istanbul Stock Exchange, 17 June 1996
General sources; *Brennan and Franks
(1997); ^Levis (1990); ~Chambers (2007)
No Yes Yes Yes Yes, but three options
Book Building Hybrid Book Building Public Offer ^or Hybrid Book
Building/Public Offer
Public Offer Public Offer (but book building for large,
international issues)
Yes - most common in 1980s Yes; dominant for many years Yes - most common  Yes - most common Yes - most popular
No No - only processing fee of NTD30  Yes ^Yes ^Yes
Yes - 1st for large, internat'l IPOs, now for
domestic also
Hybrid w/ 50% public offer Yes - for large IPOs such as
privatizations.
Allowed; became popular in the late
1990s; first used in 1997
*Placing - similar in terms of allocation
Yes Yes ^Yes, as market recovers from Asia crisis No
Became popular "in last 4 years" (i.e.,
since around 1995)
2004
Allowed - not used in 1990s Hybrid w/ 50% public offer; previously
popular
Allowed; popular in 1994-1995, then
dropped
Allowed, not popular 
Discriminatory ^Uniform price Uniform price
Yes - bb/public offer Yes - auction or bb with public offer Yes - book building with public offer;
^price set by bb before open of
subscription period
Yes - bb/public offer Yes, although many bookbuilds do not
have a retail tranche
Most recent privatization was Swisscom
(national telecommunications enterprice)
in 1998, which used book building. ^The
tender method was used in a few cases,
during the boom phase of the late 80's, but
with little success
Regulatory restrictions limited use of book
building for many years. ^Auctions were
popular for several years but were
abandoned for fixed price public offers.
In 2004, bookbuilding became popular
and seems to have replaced fixed price
public offers. From 1995-2007, there
were: 90 auctions from 1995-2003, with
92% of these from 1996-2000; 156
bookbuilds from 2004-2007; and 755
fixed price public offers from 1995-2006.
Multiple bids allowed but total bids < 3%
of shares sold.  Orders non-binding. 
Allotment to company's supporters cannot
exceed 10% of total. At least 30% of IPO
shares must be allotted to public for
subscription, unless allotted portion not
fully subscribed. Allotments of top 20
corporate or individual subscribers must
be publicly disclosed. ^ Price for hybrids
set by book building BEFORE the Public
Offer subscription period begins.
Auctions popular for two years: 18 of 24
IPOs in '94 & 7 of 29 in '95 used BB, but
none of the 17, 27 or 20 IPOs in '96, '97 or
'98 respectively used BB (except perhaps
Taç Yatirim Ortakligi A,S,, listed w/ IPO
date in '95, 1st trading date in '98). The
rest of the IPOs in these years were Fixed
Price Public Offers except for a few (6 in
'95, 3 in '96 and 1 in '98) using Sales on
the Exchange. ^Issuer must set binding
price margin (range) during registration &
inform Capital Markets Board (CMB)
about final price (w/in margin) 3 days
before IPO.
Auctions had periods of heavy use in
1960s and 1983-84. *Of 69 IPOs from
1986-89, 64 were Public Offer, 4 tender
and 1 a hybrid tender/public offer. It's not
clear how many placings occurred in this
period. ^Before the Big Bang on 27 Oct.
1986, placings were not allowed for issues
over GBP 3mn. ~Auctions (i.e., tenders)
were used in the UK from 1960 to 1986,
but accounted for only 8% of all IPOs in
that time, while fixed price public offer
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Prospectuses for specific offerings from the US SEC (Securities and Exchange
Commission) Edgar website.
HoChiMinh Stock Exchange (HOSE)







Yes - 22 IPO auctions from 1999-2009 Yes
Uniform price Discriminatory
Not yet; the need to reconfirm orders once the final price is set would complicate the
process but could be worked out, as it has with auctions
2 main methods, firm commitment (book building) and best efforts. Book building is
more common, used for larger issues. There have been 22 uniform price IPO
auctions so far in the US (from 1999 through 2009). 19 of the auctions used the
OpenIPO method developed by WR Hambrecht, while three companies - Netsuite,
Rackspace, and Google - used auctions that were not lead-managed by WR
Hambrecht and had somewhat different features. All auction issuers so far have
reserved the right to use a "dirty" auction, but transparency is low in the US, so it is
usually not clear in practice whether or not an issuer chose to set the price below
market-clearing. Instinet used what it called a hybrid book building/auction in May,
2001. A unique feature of US auctions lead-managed by WR Hambrecht is that
many issuers have reserved the right to relay information on bidding trends to
favored investors during the bidding period, although such leakage of bidding
information is usually illegal in auctions.
Auctions began in 2005; were "open" (all
bidders in the same room) until May,
2007. ^For 1st "silent" (sealed bid)
auction for Bao Viet (Vietnam Insurance),
May 2007, 30% of bidders forfeited 10%
deposits rather than pay remainder for
their winning bids, after seeing auction
results. Vietcom Bank's Dec. 2007 auction
25% oversubscribed at reserve price but
only 90% of shares later paid for.
Potential bidders pay deposit a few days
before auction, and number is announced.
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